Re: Who is the enemy?

From: George Levy <GLevy.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 14:17:53 -0700

Marchal wrote:

> George Levy wrote


> >This paradox can easily be solved by falling back on a relativistic
> >approach. Each observer has his/her own frame of reference. All
> >perceptions are relative to the observer. Period. After all, Einstein's
> >Relativity does not use "first person" and "third person."
>
> Yes but Einstein was still confusing the methodological evacuation
> of the subject with the idea that the subject cannot be handled
> scientifically.

I don't understand. Do you mean the "methodological evaluation of the
subject..."? Which subject was Einstein evaluating or believed could not
be handled scientifically?

> And I guess you forget I am using comp, and this include that
> the set of provable arithmetical truth is a 3-person sharable
> objective set.

I guess this is the crux of the difference between us. Your starting
point is axiomatic and logical/mathematical and you believe that the set
of provable arithmetical truty is a 3-person sharable objective set. My
starting point is relativistic and I feel comfortable with a
relativistic generalization of the first/third person concept. It would
be nice if we could bridge that gap.

I guess one way to begin is to specify what are the axiomatic logical
constraints A for a set of provable arithmetical truth to be 3-person
sharable.
Second question is: Are there several logical modes of A for which this
set is sharable. If yes, then each mode corresponds to a "frame of
reference." Observers possessing identical logical modes would belong to
the same frame of reference and would experinece the same arithmetic
truths. Observers in different logical modes would experience different
loogical truths.

If three such modes can be demonstrated, then the first/third person
concept becomes insufficient to express the relationships between the
observers. We may have to fall back on a relativistic concept.



> >the machines which communicates they are consistent ([]<>t) == Fanatics
> >the machines which communicates they are inconsistent ([][]t) == People
> >with terribly poor self esteem
> >the "mad machine" == illogical people ([]f)
> >the "the wrong machine" = Misled people ([]f)
> >the "dreaming machine" = Schizophrenics ([]f)
>
> Note that the fanatics belongs to the type []<>t, but the arrogant one
> also.
> You should not forget the liar machine, also of type []f, which
> intentionaly
> mislead the others. The worst one, imo, especially in politics. Those who
> lies to their people conducts their people to a
> catastrophe, soon or later, isn't it? (I don't speak about special
> military
> information).
> (G* proves []f -> f, unlike G which does NOT proves []f -> f).
>
> So let us add in our search of "evil" definition the misinformation,
> and most probably too the surinformation (which hides info). OK?


I am fascinated by the parallelism between social systems and axiomatic
systems. Please allow me some poetic license. Each social system becomes
inconsistent given certain conditions. For example, Ghandi showed that
the British system could not possibly be "civilized" and deal with
non-violent protest in a "civilized" non-violent manner. By
demonstrating that the British presence in India was inconsistent, he
was able to kick the British out.

It may be that the rise of christianity in ancient Rome happened when
judaism monotheism exposed the inconsistency of the Roman religious
beliefs.

Modern terrorists take advantage of our freedoms (economic, legal,
etc..) to perform their evil acts. These may be our inconsistencies.

The big question is this: is it possible to expose the inconsistencies
of terrorists and terrorist organizations? What are their
inconsistencies? What methods should we use to get rid of them, that
will remain consistent with our own system?

George
Received on Wed Sep 26 2001 - 14:24:38 PDT