Re: Who is the enemy?

From: George Levy <>
Date: Sun, 23 Sep 2001 18:03:13 -0700

Marchal wrote:
> George Levy wrote:
> >Let me propose a conjecture and let us see how far we can go with it:
> >
> >"Morality is the creation, protection and preservation of information.
> >Immorality is the destruction of information."

> >The Taliban operate within a very inflexible system. Bruno would call it
> >G. Our system on the other hand is much more flexible and adaptable.
> >Because our way of life allows a continuous adaptation we cannot be
> >described as a G. -- WE ARE THE TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES! Clearly we present
> >a threat to the terrorists: OUR WAY OF LIFE SHOWS THAT THEIR G IS
> >INCONSISTENT! In an evil attempt to restore their consistency, they
> >attempt to eliminate our way of life. They won't succeed. We shall
> >adapt. The world will end up better with more information.
> In term of G/G* the two enemies of the UTM I described were those
> machines which communicates they are consistent ([]<>t), the
> machines which communicates they are inconsistent ([][]t).
> And then there are the traditional communicator of the false ([]t).
> Among those are the "mad machine", "the wrong machine" the "dreaming
> machine", and the lier.

In common human parlance:
the machines which communicates they are consistent ([]<>t) == Fanatics
the machines which communicates they are inconsistent ([][]t) == People
with terribly poor self esteem
the "mad machine" == Illogical people
the "the wrong machine" = Misled people
the "dreaming machine" = Schizophrenics
> Your expression "their G" is ambiguous.

I guess I was talking mostly about the fanatics and the misled people.
One could also argue that these people do not have a rigorous scientific
upbringing and are very much driven by their emotions. Therefore, they
may be classified as illogical. They definitely are not schizos and do
not suffer from poor self esteem.

> Of course any machine or entity feeling free to ask and talk is a
> threat for totalitarian power.

> >To go any further I must now define the concept of objective world in
> >relative terms. Objective worlds are worlds which share frames of
> >reference "close enough" to the first person world as to be
> >indistinguishable from it.
> This is an interesting idea which could help us for defining
> the first person plural. I interpret your "worlds" as histories though.

Instantaneous states of minds (Observer-Moments) that include
PERCEPTIONS of histories.

> >First and third person perceptions are
> >identical when the third persons live in such objective worlds. First
> >and third person perceptions differ (as in Quantum Suicide QS or FIN)
> >when the frames of reference are too far apart.
> I am not sure there could be third person perception. May be I miss
> something. Perhaps you mean the first person plural which indeed
> is localy third person and is linked to continua of very similar
> histories (which interfere from the 1-plural point of view). OK then.

I have been using "first person and third person" to accomodate the
vocabulary used in this list. However, there is definitely something
wrong with these concepts. All perceptions have to be first person.

When the frame of reference are very close to each other "first person
and third person perceptions are identical.

When the frames of reference are too dissimilar as in QS, there is no
objective reality, and therefore, there is no "third person."

In either case the concept of "third person" is useless. So why use
"first person?"

This paradox can easily be solved by falling back on a relativistic
approach. Each observer has his/her own frame of reference. All
perceptions are relative to the observer. Period. After all, Einstein's
Relativity does not use "first person" and "third person."

> >I would like to make a distinction between absolute morality and
> >objective morality. As I explained above absolute morality does not
> >exist - absolute information remains at zero no matter what. Objective
> >morality on the other hand does because objective worlds do exist.
> >Objective information can change.
> OK if you still interpret "objective worlds" as shared continua of
> near computational histories (with comp, sorry).

OK. With comp. But as I mentionned above, we are dealing with
instantaneous mental (memory) states that include perceptions of

> >QS or FIN however does not fall within the scope of objective morality
> >because, in this case, the first and third person worlds are very
> >significantly different. The only type of morality that applies is first
> >person morality. It appears that the action of QTI or FIN actually
> >creates first person information! Since I believe that measure does not
> >change with QS it appears that QS or FIN is actually moral! This is a
> >disturbing but IMO an inescapable conclusion!!!
> Yes. And that explain why there is nothing wrong with suicide, a priori,
> at least once your relative agrees and you are prudent not wounding or
> killing others in the process.

hmmmmm. I would not be aware of dying and therefore not be aware
wounding or killing other people. My heart agrees with you but not my
mind. This is counterintuitive!

> Now as I said, comp is not normative and admit quite incompatible
> philosophical extensions, some bearing on moral questions.
> The main difference is between those who accept teleportation with
> delayed *annihilation*, and those who doesn't.
> What do you think of the people of the planet Ixbul? They fear
> the non success of the reconstitution so that they made themselves
> annihilated only after a conversation with their own doppelganger.
> Is that a form of suicide?

The problem is that, from their own point of view, their annihilation
will not succeed!!! The annihilation machine will break! They will
remain stuck with their doppelganger. Oh well! Their identity will begin
diverging from the moment of duplication and new information will be
created. This information will not be lost. The operation therefore is

> Some on Ixbul accepts to do the following: to duplicate themselves
> and then killing randomly, with a coin, one of them. They repeat
> the trial 64 times. They do not impose the
> tribulation to any other, and that test is available for adult only.
> Is that immoral? (I suppose they have found a way of killing themselves
> absolutely, which does not necessarily exists with comp!).

Their perception is that the coin will come up in their favor 64 times
in a row! Assuming ideal operation of the duplicator, there is no loss
of information and therefore the operation is not immoral. In the
plenitude, of course, theysh all survive!

Received on Sun Sep 23 2001 - 18:10:27 PDT

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