RE: Conventional QTI = False

From: Charles Goodwin <cgoodwin.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2001 12:06:45 +1200

Re wrapping around - I've set MS Outlook to wrap at 132 characters (the largest value it will accept). It insists that I wrap
somewhere (unfortunately). If you know any way to improve the situation let me know (I often go through and manually stick together
the short lines). I could miss out the >'s on quoted bits, but that might be confusing....

Re the SWE versus logical consistency. I suspect that at some deep level the two might become the same thing. If you are thinking of
logical consistency from the pov of a conscious observer, I'm not sure what that entails. Is it logically consistent to find that
you're "really" a 30-D octopus playing a 3D virtual reality game? I suppose it might be... But then I'm not sure what LC consists of
on this argument. It can't consist of continuity or a lack of surprises!

Using the SWE is definitely basing the argument on the known laws of QM, if not GR. The underlying assumption of the MWI is that the
SWE describes *everything* (or that it's a very good approximation to the real explanation). Since QTI is based on the MWI, it has
to assume the SWE as its basis, I would say. Logical consistency is probably a "lower level" requirement that in some manner
generates the SWE (according to comp. theory at least). But if we're operating on the level of QM and not worrying about what goes
on "underneath" then I'd say the SWE has got to be the basis of QTI.

However I must admit I don't see how using the SWE limits the size of the multiverse. The SWE predicts a continuum of resultant
states from a given initial states, which leads me to assume that (if the MWI is correct) the multiverse must contain a continuum /
uncountable infinity of states. If that's a limit it's a fairly large one by most standards!

Re logically possible vs physically possible universes. The "set" (or whatever one shoud call it) of all logically possible
universes is called Platonia by Julian Barbour. The "set" of all physically possible universes with the same laws of physics as ours
(plus some extra information, as David Deutsch has pointed out) is called the Multiverse. Platonia is either as big as the MV (both
being continua) or bigger (a higher order of infinity than the Multiverse).

All the above assumes the MWI is correct (evidence: quantum interference), and that Platonia exists (evidence (?) : the weak
anthropic principle).

Charles

> -----Original Message-----
> From: George Levy [mailto:GLevy.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 10:48 a.m.
> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False
>
>
>
>
> Charles Goodwin wrote:
>
> > George Levy wrote
> > > I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the
> > > conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that
> > > seems logical
> > > to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically
> > > consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for
> > > consciousness.
> >
> > I think the only constraint is that the extensions should
> be physically possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave
> > equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but
> the SWE is the constraining factor.
> >
>
> Interesting. You claim that the only constraint is the SWE. You opinion
> is based I presume on our current knowledge of physical laws. This puts
> a definite limit on the size of the multiverse. I claim the only
> constraint is logical consistency basing myself on the anthropic
> principle. This also puts a limit on the size of the multiverse. Bruno
> Marshall claims he can bridge the two by deriving the SWE (or maybe a
> simplified form) from logical consistency which implies that the
> currently conceivable physical multiverse is equal in size with the
> logical multiverse.
>
> BTW, your posts are the only ones that do not automatically wrap around
> at the end of a line, unless you start a new paragraph. Is there any way
> you or I (us?) could fix this?
>
> George
Received on Tue Sep 11 2001 - 17:04:16 PDT

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