Re: Conventional QTI = False

From: Saibal Mitra <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2001 13:06:38 +0200

I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next
experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations
were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this
that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being
infinitely old, or that you should live for arbitrary long. If you are
severly injured in an accident and dying, then the probability that you will
survive in a branch where the accident never happened is much larger than
living on in a branch where the accident did happen.

That continuations with memory loss are important can be verified
``experimentally´´ (I don't remember everything that has happened to me).
There are also continuations of me that never forget anything. I am not one
of them.

Saibal


Russell Standish wrote:

> Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This
> doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to
> forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense.
>
> Cheers
>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >
>
> > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
=
> > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a =
> > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a =
> > long time ago.
> >
> > Saibal
> >
>
>
>
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Received on Mon Sep 10 2001 - 04:15:38 PDT

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