RE: FIN

From: Charles Goodwin <cgoodwin.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 09:41:56 +1200

Hi, I have just joined this list after seeing it mentioned on the Fabric of Reality list....

Would someone mind briefly explaining what FIN is (or at least what the letters stand for)? Is it some version of QTI (Quantum
theory of immortality) ?

Assuming it *is* related to QTI...

Why should a typical observer find himself to be older than the apparent lifetime of his species? Given that survival for indefinite
time becomes "thermodynamically unlikely" (TU) after some age (i.e. has a measure incredibly close to zero compared to other
outcomes for anyone except the observer concerned) - say this age is 120 for a human being, then he still has to live through 120
years to get there. But most of his copies in the multiverse (you are assuming MWI for this argument, I assume?) will in fact die at
a reasonable age, so *very* few observeres are going to notice the TU versions of anyone else. So the only way to actually
experience this phenomenon is to live to be that old yourself.

I must ask, though, what makes you think that a typical observer ISN'T much older than the lifetime of his species would allow?
Given that you can't observe anyone but yourself in this state (or it's "TU" that you ever will) (and I'm assuming you haven't
reached 120 yet), you can't really use a self-sampling
argument on this, surely?

....if FIN isn't related to QTI (it appears to be from the stuff I'm replying to but you never know) please ignore the above
comments :-)

Charles

> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:smitra.domain.name.hidden]
> > Sent: Thursday, 30 August 2001 9:05 p.m.
> > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > Subject: Re: FIN
> >
> >
> > Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >
> >
> > > >From: "Saibal Mitra" <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
> > > >Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > > > `` I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence
> > that if that
> > were
> > > >true, then a typical observer would find himself to be
> > much older than
> > the
> > > >apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact
> > that you do not
> > find
> > > >yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of
> > about 0 that it
> > is
> > > >the truth. However, they hold fast to their
> > incomprehensible beliefs.´´
> > > >
> > > >According to FIN, however, the probability of being
> alive at all is
> > almost
> > > >zero, which contradicts our experience of being alive.
> > >
> > > Whatchya mean? I wouldn't mind acquiring a new
> > argument against FIN
> > to
> > > add to the ones I give, but your statement doesn't appear
> > to make any
> > sense.
> >
> > You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to
> > a copy. But
> > consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same
> consciousness
> > already because they were identical.
> >
> > I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You
> > appear to say that
> > (forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one
> > computation. Even
> > an identical computation performed somewhere else will have a
> > different
> > identity.
> >
> > My objection is that the brain is constantly changing due to various
> > processes. The typical timescales of these processes is about
> > a millisecond.
> > FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few
> > milliseconds.
> >
> > Saibal
> >
>
Received on Thu Aug 30 2001 - 14:39:43 PDT