Re: FIN

From: Saibal Mitra <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2001 11:05:09 +0200

Jacques Mallah wrote:


> >From: "Saibal Mitra" <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
> >Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > `` I have repeated pointed out the obvious consequence that if that
were
> >true, then a typical observer would find himself to be much older than
the
> >apparent lifetime of his species would allow; the fact that you do not
find
> >yourself so old gives their hypothesis a probability of about 0 that it
is
> >the truth. However, they hold fast to their incomprehensible beliefs.
> >
> >According to FIN, however, the probability of being alive at all is
almost
> >zero, which contradicts our experience of being alive.
>
> Whatchya mean? I wouldn't mind acquiring a new argument against FIN
to
> add to the ones I give, but your statement doesn't appear to make any
sense.

You wrote earlier that consciousness can't be transferred to a copy. But
consciousness isn't transferred, the copies had the same consciousness
already because they were identical.

I would say: I exist because somewhere I am computed. You appear to say that
(forgive me if I am wrong) I must identify myself with one computation. Even
an identical computation performed somewhere else will have a different
identity.

My objection is that the brain is constantly changing due to various
processes. The typical timescales of these processes is about a millisecond.
FIN thus predicts that I shouldn't find myself alive after a few
milliseconds.

Saibal
Received on Thu Aug 30 2001 - 02:11:53 PDT

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