Re: James Higgo

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri Aug 17 09:26:27 2001

Jacques Mallah wrote


>>From: George Levy <GLevy.domain.name.hidden>
>>It is at times like this that I hope that all our theories about
>>multiuniverses are in fact correct.
>
> It doesn't matter, of course. First, the measure of James-like beings
>(summing over time) is now known to be smaller than we thought it would be;
>that's true no matter what.


Sometimes you speak like if you *have* solved your "implementation
problem".
How could you know now?

With the comp hyp., or just the QM hyp., (and this in a completely
provable
way taking just Everett memory machines in the non relativistic setting),
you should not sum up on "time", but you must sum up on *all* consistent
neighborhoods. (Time and space emerges on that eventually through comp).

You really speak like a quantum Bohmian, discarding quasi-magically all
computational histories but one.
 
Decoherence explains only why those "worlds" get rather quickly
inaccessible for most of *each* of us,
(= "Is" with George Levy first person plural plenal, or noush?).

Why do you put "many world" in your signature?
The James Higgos of the "other worlds" are zombie or what?
I'm not sure it is consolating or reassuring, but that's another point.

How do you distinguish yourself from numerically indentical
counterparts?


>Secondly, the 'classical' universe is surely
>large enough that there still exist similar beings, or at least, beings that
>we would place equal utility on the existance of.
>So, with or without the
>MWI, the effect of this news on our utility functions should be about the
>same.


Sorry we were talking about James *own* utility functions and
expectations,
from James own first person "average" consistent point of view.


The first person.
The one you mention in your signature (btw):

The one who knows no one else knows ...


Bruno
Received on Fri Aug 17 2001 - 09:26:27 PDT