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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Tue Jul 3 07:43:29 2001

Joel:

*>Bruno:
*

*>> But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical
*

*>> contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and
*

*>> honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are more
*

*>> probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some coffee. I
*

*>> would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was telling you that I
*

*>> do not believe "drinking" coffee is probable. So "something" is
*

*>> probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must explain why, after I have
*

*>> done coffee, drinking coffee got an higher degree of probability. We
*

*>> must aknowledge that physicalist do have an explanation here. There
*

*>> is coffee, there is a material machine preparing it, etc.
*

*>
*

*>Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed
*

*>solution.
*

I am glad you begin to see the problem. I have not proposed a

solution (yet), I have only try to give an accurate description

of the problem. Later I will point onto some strategy to search the

solution, which, btw, cannot be "proposed". The solution exists

or does not exists. If the solution does not exists (provably),

then comp is false (refuted).

*>Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past
*

*>observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible
*

*>histories, or 3) something else entirely.
*

Nicely formulated question: it is neither "1)", neither "2)", neither

"3)" !

What I want to do ... Well, no: what I'm *obliged* to do (keeping comp)

is to explain why "1)" seems to work giving that comp force me to

accept "2)". We must justified something like "2) => 1)".

Perhaps more precisely: why a third person "2)" implies a first person

"1)". Perhaps that will be clearer below where I will attempt

to conclude the UDA less rapidly.

*>In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible.
*

*>
*

*>For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making
*

*>it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you
*

*>make coffee, you will most likely drink it.
*

I agree, except that this is what we need to explain.

*>This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our
*

*>world appears to be mostly "predictable". But it will start to fail in
*

*>worlds where there is little regularity. (e.g. making coffee and drinking
*

*>coffee almost never happen)
*

So we must explain why, summing on all computational stories, we

stabilise on "predictable" stories. Note also that an expression like

"our world" is unavoidably ambiguous, and strictly speaking cannot

be used with comp (through the UDA).

*>But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful
*

*>predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite.
*

Yes, even uncountable. But that is not a problem. Measure theory,

including Lebesgue integration theory has been invented for dealing

with probability on uncountable domains. This is used in elementary

(non relativistic) quantum mechanics too.

The problem is not even to find an ad hoc measure which makes the

white rabbit stories negligeable, but to show that the unique measure

forced by UDA (or arithmetical translation of UDA) is such that

rabbit stories are (relatively) negligeable in it.

In case it is not, comp is refuted.

*>> Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer
*

*>> science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive
*

*>> physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply
*

*>> derive physics from (machine) psychology.
*

*>>
*

*>> Do you agree?
*

*>
*

*>I'm not sure. I'm still unclear about what you are proposing.
*

I am not proposing anything. I'm just showing that if we are machine

then next instants are defined by a (relative) measure put on

the set of consistent reconstitutions *as seen by themselves* (the

1-person psychology) generated by the UD.

*>How can we derive physics from psychology?
*

Interesting question. Note that the UDA just show that: if we are

machine then we *must* derive physics from psychology (itself, by

comp, embedded in number (meta) theory.

Mmh... UDA shows more. It shows that your next instant is

"determined" by all computational histories (generated bu the UD)

going through your 3-state.

*>Can you give some simple example, like the coffee experiment?
*

Excellent idea! I will make myself a cup of coffee.

*>> If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your MUCA
*

*>> is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!! We should prove
*

*>> it, for exemple by showing that the measure behave well only thanks
*

*>> to the infinite MUCAs' work generated in arithmetics (or by any DUs,
*

*>> or in Numberland, as I like to say.
*

*>
*

*>No - sorry. I don't understand that either. I think you've lost me.
*

*>
*

*>> If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps you
*

*>> can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting some
*

*>> continuum, and some random oracle, ...
*

*>
*

*>Infinite possibilities? I don't know.
*

Remember that you have answered "yes" to the ten first question.

Let us run the UD "again", and let us look what happens when I

am preparing a cup of coffee.

Let us consider one instantaneous (relative) description of my

state of mind S among the states I am going through during my

coffee preparation.

And look what does the UD. It generates that state S infinitely

often. Oh, at first it generates that state in 10^googol steps, and

it generates it again much (very much) later. It generates it

through different but similar computational histories. It generates

"dummy" copies also : for exemple it generate S + 0, and later S + 1,

and later S + 00, and later S + 01, and later S + 10, ... ,

and later S + 00000000100010000111, and later ..., dovetailing

on all finite initial segment of the real.

This is of course still countable when you look at the domain

from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in

question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so

the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which is of course a first person

notion, is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the

union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or)

of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite

three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a

two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee"

state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written

it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).

So UDA gives the shape of the solution. The technical problem

which remains is to isolate the "correct" proximity relation

among infinite computational histories.

Do you understand?

(But here we are near entering the second part of my thesis

where I begin to extract that topology/measure from intensional

variants of the logic of provability (godelian self reference logic),

or, as I like to say, I interview the sound universal machine

about that measure).

Believe it or not but I drank that coffee unconsciously!!!

I will try again ... :-)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal

Received on Tue Jul 03 2001 - 07:43:29 PDT

Date: Tue Jul 3 07:43:29 2001

Joel:

I am glad you begin to see the problem. I have not proposed a

solution (yet), I have only try to give an accurate description

of the problem. Later I will point onto some strategy to search the

solution, which, btw, cannot be "proposed". The solution exists

or does not exists. If the solution does not exists (provably),

then comp is false (refuted).

Nicely formulated question: it is neither "1)", neither "2)", neither

"3)" !

What I want to do ... Well, no: what I'm *obliged* to do (keeping comp)

is to explain why "1)" seems to work giving that comp force me to

accept "2)". We must justified something like "2) => 1)".

Perhaps more precisely: why a third person "2)" implies a first person

"1)". Perhaps that will be clearer below where I will attempt

to conclude the UDA less rapidly.

I agree, except that this is what we need to explain.

So we must explain why, summing on all computational stories, we

stabilise on "predictable" stories. Note also that an expression like

"our world" is unavoidably ambiguous, and strictly speaking cannot

be used with comp (through the UDA).

Yes, even uncountable. But that is not a problem. Measure theory,

including Lebesgue integration theory has been invented for dealing

with probability on uncountable domains. This is used in elementary

(non relativistic) quantum mechanics too.

The problem is not even to find an ad hoc measure which makes the

white rabbit stories negligeable, but to show that the unique measure

forced by UDA (or arithmetical translation of UDA) is such that

rabbit stories are (relatively) negligeable in it.

In case it is not, comp is refuted.

I am not proposing anything. I'm just showing that if we are machine

then next instants are defined by a (relative) measure put on

the set of consistent reconstitutions *as seen by themselves* (the

1-person psychology) generated by the UD.

Interesting question. Note that the UDA just show that: if we are

machine then we *must* derive physics from psychology (itself, by

comp, embedded in number (meta) theory.

Mmh... UDA shows more. It shows that your next instant is

"determined" by all computational histories (generated bu the UD)

going through your 3-state.

Excellent idea! I will make myself a cup of coffee.

Remember that you have answered "yes" to the ten first question.

Let us run the UD "again", and let us look what happens when I

am preparing a cup of coffee.

Let us consider one instantaneous (relative) description of my

state of mind S among the states I am going through during my

coffee preparation.

And look what does the UD. It generates that state S infinitely

often. Oh, at first it generates that state in 10^googol steps, and

it generates it again much (very much) later. It generates it

through different but similar computational histories. It generates

"dummy" copies also : for exemple it generate S + 0, and later S + 1,

and later S + 00, and later S + 01, and later S + 10, ... ,

and later S + 00000000100010000111, and later ..., dovetailing

on all finite initial segment of the real.

This is of course still countable when you look at the domain

from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in

question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so

the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which is of course a first person

notion, is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the

union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or)

of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite

three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a

two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee"

state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written

it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).

So UDA gives the shape of the solution. The technical problem

which remains is to isolate the "correct" proximity relation

among infinite computational histories.

Do you understand?

(But here we are near entering the second part of my thesis

where I begin to extract that topology/measure from intensional

variants of the logic of provability (godelian self reference logic),

or, as I like to say, I interview the sound universal machine

about that measure).

Believe it or not but I drank that coffee unconsciously!!!

I will try again ... :-)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal

Received on Tue Jul 03 2001 - 07:43:29 PDT

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