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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat Jun 30 11:43:31 2001

Joel wrote:

*>Bruno:
*

*>> Sorry for the delay, but I am web-connected only at work, and at
*

*>> work ..., well I have to work, sometimes :-)
*

*>
*

*>Yes, I know how that goes!
*

*>
*

*>> OK. I see you *are* a "computationalist" !
*

*>
*

*>Yes, it sounds like I am. :)
*

*>
*

*>And I think I am comfortable with all of the situations you have presented.
*

*>(surviving duplication, etc.)
*

*>
*

*>> Here is question 6. Perhaps the first not so obvious one. Do you
*

*>> agree that, if I ask you at Brussels, before the Washington-Moscow
*

*>> duplication experiment: "Where will you *feel* to be after the
*

*>> experiment will be completed?" that although you can answer "you will
*

*>> see me at Washington and at Moscow", your first person diary will
*

*>> either contain "I am at Moscow" or I am at Washington" so that you
*

*>> cannot predict with certainty where you will feel to be?"
*

*>
*

*>Yes.. if I understand you correctly, I think you are correct.
*

*>
*

*>In general, there's no way I can tell where I will be next.
*

Formidable. Some people find the question 6 difficult if not meaningless.

This means that you understand the comp 1-indeterminacy. It is

just the fact that in a self-duplication experiment W M, you cannot

tell where you 1-will be next (although you can tell where you 3-will be

next). {W, M} is the domain of indeterminacy ("definition").

But if there is an 1-indeterminacy, there is a hope, at least, to quantify

on some domain, that 1-indeterminacy.

Why should we quantify that 1-indeterminacy?

Practical reason: well, I'm sure you should suit the European

Teleportation

Link Service Inc. in case you learn that the post they used, sold copy of

you

to perverse owners of virtual Sodome and Ghomore ... (Vivid image for

showing

the meaningfullness of the question 6). There are risks to minimize.

But there is a much more fundamental reason to isolate that

quantification.

Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in

self-multiplication

is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we are leading to?

The way to quantify the indeterminacy is the unknown. Although we can

argue

that the {W, M} duplication gives a sort of perfect 1-coin, simple

probabilty

reasoning leads quickly to hard problems.

I still keep questioning you, because I need to show some invariance

property of *any* form of quantification a computationalist can agree

with.

Question 7: You are at Brussels (let us say), ready for a duplication WM.

Let us consider the two following 3-experiments/1-experiences:

1) just the simple duplication WM, where the W and M reconstitutions are

made simultaneously.

2) A duplication WM where an arbitrary reconstitution delay is made at

Moscow.

Do you agree that again the two sets of 1-experiences remains unchanged

(from a 1-pov), although they are 3-different?

Put in another way, do you agree that if we quantify the WM

1-indeterminacy

by a uniform probability distribution, then you should do the same for

the second experiment.

That question is a mix of question 3 and question 5.

The following question is question 7 with a null delay.

Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia Brussels.

Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. Or, if you prefer

we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in zero time.

Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication then

P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation without destruction

of the original?

Bruno

Received on Sat Jun 30 2001 - 11:43:31 PDT

Date: Sat Jun 30 11:43:31 2001

Joel wrote:

Formidable. Some people find the question 6 difficult if not meaningless.

This means that you understand the comp 1-indeterminacy. It is

just the fact that in a self-duplication experiment W M, you cannot

tell where you 1-will be next (although you can tell where you 3-will be

next). {W, M} is the domain of indeterminacy ("definition").

But if there is an 1-indeterminacy, there is a hope, at least, to quantify

on some domain, that 1-indeterminacy.

Why should we quantify that 1-indeterminacy?

Practical reason: well, I'm sure you should suit the European

Teleportation

Link Service Inc. in case you learn that the post they used, sold copy of

you

to perverse owners of virtual Sodome and Ghomore ... (Vivid image for

showing

the meaningfullness of the question 6). There are risks to minimize.

But there is a much more fundamental reason to isolate that

quantification.

Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in

self-multiplication

is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we are leading to?

The way to quantify the indeterminacy is the unknown. Although we can

argue

that the {W, M} duplication gives a sort of perfect 1-coin, simple

probabilty

reasoning leads quickly to hard problems.

I still keep questioning you, because I need to show some invariance

property of *any* form of quantification a computationalist can agree

with.

Question 7: You are at Brussels (let us say), ready for a duplication WM.

Let us consider the two following 3-experiments/1-experiences:

1) just the simple duplication WM, where the W and M reconstitutions are

made simultaneously.

2) A duplication WM where an arbitrary reconstitution delay is made at

Moscow.

Do you agree that again the two sets of 1-experiences remains unchanged

(from a 1-pov), although they are 3-different?

Put in another way, do you agree that if we quantify the WM

1-indeterminacy

by a uniform probability distribution, then you should do the same for

the second experiment.

That question is a mix of question 3 and question 5.

The following question is question 7 with a null delay.

Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia Brussels.

Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. Or, if you prefer

we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in zero time.

Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication then

P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation without destruction

of the original?

Bruno

Received on Sat Jun 30 2001 - 11:43:31 PDT

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