Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

From: Joel Dobrzelewski <>
Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2001 14:59:49 -0400

>> All of this may seem academic really, since we all know that any
>> universal computer is as good as any other. It's kindof like arguing
>> about the kind of wood God's stool is made out of! But there MAY be
>> some reasons to want to know exactly which algorithm is really being
>> run on the bottom...
> I am not sure there is any (absolute) bottom.

Mustn't we assume there is?

If there is no bottom, what will we stand on?

How can we understand anything at all?

>> Ok, that's a really weak argument, since I also believe that this
>> world is made up and that its physics is rather arbitrary.
> Physics should emerge from *all computations" and I don't think it
> is arbitrary.

What I mean is that the physics of our world may be so far removed from "the
bottom" that we have no hope of seeing any meaningful relationships.

For example, if we live in a world that is designed by a malicious entity,
s/he might make things purposely confusing or misleading.

It is true that the program that computes everything will completely explain
the mad scientist and the world s/he designs (including us), but our
computers might be, for all practical purposes, useless in figuring out
his/her intentions.


If we live in a world that is designed by a friendly entity, then s/he might
make things purposely related to "the bottom", and easy to figure out.

But if, as you say, there is no bottom layer, then all of this speculation
is sortof meaningless.

> Down below (actually just below our "correct" computationalist level
> of description) you will "discover" the many "interfering"
> computations. Why "interference"? That is what I actually try to
> explain in the UDAs posts. Empirical discovery of many computations
> is what seems to happen with empirical Quantum Mechanics (cf quantum
> computers).

Ok. I am skeptical about this approach, but I'll wait and see where your
Universal Dovetailer Argument takes us.

Received on Fri Jun 29 2001 - 12:01:10 PDT

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