Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

From: Joel Dobrzelewski <>
Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2001 08:42:20 -0400


>>> The mind body admit a lot of subproblem, like what is free-will
>>An illusion.
> An illusion? That is a rather quick answer. Let us not enter into
> that perenial debate. Perhaps I should ask you exemple of what is not
> an illusion, what is your ontology.

Good idea. Let me just say that I believe the world is deterministic.

But in my mind, this is not incompatible with freewill. For example, I
believe the things I WANT to do are determined by the computation... and
then I act out the action to obtain what I want. Though technically, I can
only WANT one thing at a time.

But I realize most people do not feel this way, and they see determinism as
incompatible with freewill. So that's why I call it an illusion. It seems
like we are making decisions, but in reality, there is no alternatives.

> I should have you ask this before, if your TOE is a cellular
> automata, what does execute it?

Nothing. Cellular automata simply exist - in the abstract sense - just like
the number 3, or the concept of the circle. These objects are merely "out
there" for all to discover, and reason about.

>>> is there an afterdeath,
> That rather quick too! Amazing for a materialist, plausible for a
> computationalist, I guess. But then I don't believe materialism being
> compatible with computationalism.

As I've said, I think this world is just a game. New games await us when
this one is over. But this idea should not be too tightly connected to
cellular automata. It is only my own personal philosophy and not part of
the science, per se.

>>Qualia are internal states.
> Right! (imo). But "internal" in which sense? Would you agree that it
> is related with the first person viewpoint.

I'm not sure.

>> Ok, thank you Bruno. I think I understand the terminology now
>> (first and third person viewpoints), but I fail to see the
>> importance of it all.
> If you want I open a new thread. I send you a post with one
> question. Normally if you are computationalist you will answer yes.
> The same for the second post, etc. At the end you will understand (or
> at least to have an idea) the importance of it all. OK?

Ok, sounds fun! (I didn't quite understand the UDA - universal dovetailer
argument). What is the question? (yes, start a new thread if you prefer)

> Nevertheless I believe that the fact that 17 is prime is 3-person
> (objective) verifiable. It is a sharable reality.

Yes, I agree. This is a good example.

In a similar way, I believe minimal cellular automata are objective reality.
We can all think about, for example, the one-dimensional automaton Rule-30.
This automaton is exactly the same for everyone, and independent of any
simulation you may find yourself in.

> Let us take your cellular automata which generates everything. You
> will be generated at some "moment" (where the moment can be defined
> in the universal cellular automata terms). The problem is that you
> will be generated infinitely often, and your average "next" first
> person point of view depends on all the consistent computational
> continuations generated by your universal automata.


Yes, you are generated infinitely often, but those copies are not (usually)
in communication with one another. In general, each one has its own history
and own future. I don't see how there is any synthesis of these
experiences. They are (again, usually) independent.

Received on Thu Jun 28 2001 - 05:39:05 PDT

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