Re: Consistency? + Programs for G, G*, ...

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue Jun 5 01:23:22 2001

Hi George, Hi Brent, Hi Saibal, Hi All,

George, thanks for your encouraging statements. I'm glad you agree
fully with the UDA.
I will take my time to answer your post. It looks like the only thing
I must still explain is Godel theorem. That is really where G and G*
comes from. (Godel, Lob and perhaps Solovay).
I will try to explain that in english being the less technical
possible.
I realise also that in the archive the symbols [€] and [o] look to
similar ...


Brent, you can guess two reasons why "I don't believe in S5". The
Kripke semantics for S5 is ... Leibniz semantics, with a trivial
accessibility relation (equivalence relation). The other reason
is that in my dialog with the sound machine (the lobian machine)
S5 never appears ... (I agree this is a partial argument).

Saibal wrote:

>The Great Programmer can presumably compute certain correlations between
>our obserations of what we think is a star and the state of the observed
>system itself. As I see it the Great Programmer outputs descriptions,
>including descriptions of an astronomer observing a star. Why can't the
>Great Programmer check the description of the astronomer of a star against
>his own description?

You are putting to much in "the great programmer". The UD (at least)
 is only a "rather stupid" program which
just generates and run all possible programs (in all computer language
including quantum computers, etc.). If you personalise it so as to use
expression like "his own description" then you should define it so that
a term like "his" is well defined.

>What I meant was that the observer should have an exactly identical copy in
>a universe in which stars do exist. So the observer can't tell if stars do
>or don't exist, but it doesn't matter because he is exactly identical to an
>observer observing a real star.

What does that change for the personal (relative) point of view. I
don't understand.

> In your example you should replace Moscow by a virtual reality
>representation of Moscow. One copy of you travels to the real Moscow, the
>other copy is a digital version of you that is sent to the cyber-version
>Moscow. Suppose that we didn't tell you that we would make a digital copy
>of you. In that case your digital copy would think he is in ``real´´ Moscow.

But even if the "material" copy go to Washington, the virtual copy
will believe he is in the "real" Moscow. I'm not sure I understand you.
Once the copies are made they are as independent as me and you. Isn'it?

>Yes but shouldn't all the ``doppelbrothersisters´´ be identified?

How? and Why? If you do that please identify myself with any amoeba,
planaria, ... yourself and any living creature from the multiverse.

Bruno

PS Thanks to Wei for the 60kb.
Received on Tue Jun 05 2001 - 01:23:22 PDT