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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat Apr 7 09:02:28 2001

Hi George,

I finish my post yesterday a little too quickly.

I said:

*>I hope your binder will not explode.
*

*>My next post will anticipate toward the end of my proof to glimpse
*

*>the "quasi-appearance of Hilbert Space" when we explain the UDA TE
*

*>to the guardian angel of the sound machine.
*

*>
*

*>And, just because you promise me a prize for deriving SE from
*

*>the "psychology of machine" I tell you that I have decided
*

*>to call the modal formula (the one for the symmetrical frame):
*

*>
*

*> p->[]<>p,
*

*>
*

*> the little abstract Schroedinger Equation (LASE),
*

*>
*

*>as I have called before the (godel-like) formula
*

*>
*

*> <>p -> -[]<>p
*

*>
*

*> the first theorem of machine's psychology. (FTMP)
*

*>
*

*>And our goal is to find a natural bridge from FTMP to LASE.
*

*>
*

*>I must say that I have believe for a quite long time that this was
*

*>impossible. But then when you take the definition of knowledge
*

*>belief, observation/perception in Plato's thaetetus, then the
*

*>aritmetical translation of the UDA TE will lead us directly toward
*

*>the solution.
*

*>And so you will be obliged to give me the prize (at least
*

*>a little abstract price!).
*

Of course this is not entirely correct. You should "give me

the prize" only:

1) when you will see what I mean when I say that

<>p -> -[]<>p is a fundamental theorem in machine's psychology.

+ (above all):

2) when you understand why I dare to call the formula p->[]<>p the

little abstract schroedinger equation.

+ (of course):

3) when it will be clear how I translate

the UDA TE and how that translation isolates a derivation of

LASE from FTMP.

I explain informally a little bit.

ABOUT 1):

When the box []p is interpreted in english as provable(p), i.e.

provable by a honest UTM, the <>p, which is -[]-p, can be read as

p is consistant. This follows from the fact that if -p is not provable

then you can add p to the set of axioms used by the machine without

being lead to a contradiction. (Indeed if the machine derives the

false from -p, then the machine derives (-p -> FALSE), which is --p,

which is p). More directly <>TRUE is the same as -[]-TRUE = -[]FALSE,

= I do not prove the FALSE = I am consistent.

So <>p -> -[]<>p is just a modal form of a generalisation of Godel's

second incompleteness theorem, and in English you can read that

formula in the following way. if p is consistent then I cannot prove

that p is consistent.

When the machine proves the particular case (<>TRUE -> -[]<>TRUE),

that is Godel's second theorem, it is as if the machine was telling

us: if I am consistent I cannot prove it.

A more psychological reading of that formula is, by identifying

(audaciously perhaps) consistency with consciousness (or awakeness)

you get "if I am conscious then I cannot prove it.

Note that any formula with the form <>p can be read there is an

accessible observer-moment (world) with p true at it. So when the

talk about <>p, the machine talk about a consistent extension of

herself.

To sum up, the 1) above is linked to Godel's theorem, seen as a

psychological limitation of machine. Later I will be hopefully

a little more rigorous about the link consciousness/consistency.

ABOUT 2):

Why do I consider the formula p->[]<>p as an abstract form

of SE ?

Surely that deserves some words of explanation. Unfortunately

to explain this, we must leave the cocooning logic of plato

heaven (classical logic) for the jungle of what is called

the WEAK LOGIC.

The theorems of a weak logic makes a subset of the theorems

of classical logic.

We will meet essentially two principal weak logics:

intuitionistic logic and quantum logic.

For exemple a typical classical tautology which is not a theorem

for intuitionnistic logic is the principle of excluded middle

p v -p

And a classical tautology which is not a theorem of quantum logic

is

p & (q v r) <-> (p & q) v (p & r)

That is, in quantum logic there is a failure of the distributivity

axioms.

It has been proved that both intuitionist and quantum logic

doesn't have truth table semantics. But modal logics can help

us to handle those weak logics without leaving plato heaven.

In particular the modal logic, known as B, with the axioms

[]p ->p, p->[]<>p and with the rule of modus ponens and necessitation

has a non trivial relationship with quantum logic.

In fact we have a representation theorem (by Goldblatt) which

says that when B proves []<>A, QL proves A. (I simplify a

little bit). Sometimes []<>A is called the quantization of A.

Isolating the formula p->[]<>p is also a good step toward

defining a measure on the relative set of consistant extension.

ABOUT 3). (later).

I stop here. I hope you are not overwhelmed by the information.

Here I have just try to anticipate a little. I must say that I

not to busy now, but unfortunately I will be quickly more and more

busy. So I give you something to eat for a long period.

(except that I will try to say a little more about 3) still

this week).

Nevertheless, don't hesitate to tell me "enough!" or one of your

"hmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm". I would understand. Of course it is not

so easy to understand my work which is not only transdisciplinar

but also goes accross very different kind of logics.

Bruno

Received on Sat Apr 07 2001 - 09:02:28 PDT

Date: Sat Apr 7 09:02:28 2001

Hi George,

I finish my post yesterday a little too quickly.

I said:

Of course this is not entirely correct. You should "give me

the prize" only:

1) when you will see what I mean when I say that

<>p -> -[]<>p is a fundamental theorem in machine's psychology.

+ (above all):

2) when you understand why I dare to call the formula p->[]<>p the

little abstract schroedinger equation.

+ (of course):

3) when it will be clear how I translate

the UDA TE and how that translation isolates a derivation of

LASE from FTMP.

I explain informally a little bit.

ABOUT 1):

When the box []p is interpreted in english as provable(p), i.e.

provable by a honest UTM, the <>p, which is -[]-p, can be read as

p is consistant. This follows from the fact that if -p is not provable

then you can add p to the set of axioms used by the machine without

being lead to a contradiction. (Indeed if the machine derives the

false from -p, then the machine derives (-p -> FALSE), which is --p,

which is p). More directly <>TRUE is the same as -[]-TRUE = -[]FALSE,

= I do not prove the FALSE = I am consistent.

So <>p -> -[]<>p is just a modal form of a generalisation of Godel's

second incompleteness theorem, and in English you can read that

formula in the following way. if p is consistent then I cannot prove

that p is consistent.

When the machine proves the particular case (<>TRUE -> -[]<>TRUE),

that is Godel's second theorem, it is as if the machine was telling

us: if I am consistent I cannot prove it.

A more psychological reading of that formula is, by identifying

(audaciously perhaps) consistency with consciousness (or awakeness)

you get "if I am conscious then I cannot prove it.

Note that any formula with the form <>p can be read there is an

accessible observer-moment (world) with p true at it. So when the

talk about <>p, the machine talk about a consistent extension of

herself.

To sum up, the 1) above is linked to Godel's theorem, seen as a

psychological limitation of machine. Later I will be hopefully

a little more rigorous about the link consciousness/consistency.

ABOUT 2):

Why do I consider the formula p->[]<>p as an abstract form

of SE ?

Surely that deserves some words of explanation. Unfortunately

to explain this, we must leave the cocooning logic of plato

heaven (classical logic) for the jungle of what is called

the WEAK LOGIC.

The theorems of a weak logic makes a subset of the theorems

of classical logic.

We will meet essentially two principal weak logics:

intuitionistic logic and quantum logic.

For exemple a typical classical tautology which is not a theorem

for intuitionnistic logic is the principle of excluded middle

p v -p

And a classical tautology which is not a theorem of quantum logic

is

p & (q v r) <-> (p & q) v (p & r)

That is, in quantum logic there is a failure of the distributivity

axioms.

It has been proved that both intuitionist and quantum logic

doesn't have truth table semantics. But modal logics can help

us to handle those weak logics without leaving plato heaven.

In particular the modal logic, known as B, with the axioms

[]p ->p, p->[]<>p and with the rule of modus ponens and necessitation

has a non trivial relationship with quantum logic.

In fact we have a representation theorem (by Goldblatt) which

says that when B proves []<>A, QL proves A. (I simplify a

little bit). Sometimes []<>A is called the quantization of A.

Isolating the formula p->[]<>p is also a good step toward

defining a measure on the relative set of consistant extension.

ABOUT 3). (later).

I stop here. I hope you are not overwhelmed by the information.

Here I have just try to anticipate a little. I must say that I

not to busy now, but unfortunately I will be quickly more and more

busy. So I give you something to eat for a long period.

(except that I will try to say a little more about 3) still

this week).

Nevertheless, don't hesitate to tell me "enough!" or one of your

"hmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm". I would understand. Of course it is not

so easy to understand my work which is not only transdisciplinar

but also goes accross very different kind of logics.

Bruno

Received on Sat Apr 07 2001 - 09:02:28 PDT

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