You should definitely read Russell's book on Liebnitz. A monad is like an observer moment: self-contained and not able to interact with the infinite number of other monads.
----Original Message-----
From: rwas rwas <mc68332.domain.name.hidden>
To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
Subject: Re: Transporter Paradox
Date: Tuesday, March 20, 2001 9:58 PM
> "Prove" is a strong word. I don't think you can
> prove that we perceive
> 3-space...
I guess it depends on what you mean by "perceive".
If I develop software that behaves a certain way in
3-space combining observations, a plan, and then
demonstrating an action in that 3-space, I'd say that
system perceives in 3-space.
If I take a black box and train it to do the same
thing, without knowing anything about how the blackbox
internals are implemented, I'd still say that system
perceives 3-space.
In the pleasure example, one can perceive pleasurable
acts in this realm. They can do so without being
limited to experiencing pleasure in this realm. I
would argue that pleasure is not a law limited to the
physical realm.
Likewise, one can perceive in 3-space without being of
it. What I mean here is that we may observe or deduce
physical facilities (in the human body) for perceiving
3-space. It does not mean one perceives 3-space as a
result of, and only-because-of that facility.
You might observe these things or facilities (physical
mechanisms) and assume that's how such abilities can
be. I'd argue these things are apparent, and provide
an interface between one realm and another.
One might consider software operating in a computer.
The machine is the mechanism used to animate the
software. The software's operation implies and
expresses a logical (usually) intent of the
programmer. So we have three layers of expression. One
is mechanical, one is descriptive (software itself),
and one is the actual intent of the programmer (what
it does). We can say that the entity formed at the 3rd
layer (what it does) is not bound to what lies beneath
it. We could say (similarly to what some sculptors
say) that it was always there (what it does), and the
software and the machine it runs on, simply revealed
it. I would further say, that not only is the act of
writing the software and running it simply revealing
something that was already there, but it reveals it
*here* (physical) from somewhere else (non-physical
realm).
> you can only observe behavior (careful!
> are you assuming
> 3-space in which to observe).
What is it to "observe" in a non-temporal realm?
If a behavior is expressed non-temporally, you have a
static picture (crude approximation). Then did the
person producing the behavior create that picture? Or
did they simply journey to a place where it already
existed? If so, why can't an observer do the same? If
he can, what is observation?
> On the other hand
> there is plenty of
> non-verbal as well as verbal evidence for pain and
> pleasure (avoidance,
> attraction...)
I ment to say, that you may stimulate what is widely
considered pleasure in someone, and they might elect
to say that the stimulus is pleasurable.
You might observe or deduce and test the apparent
physical mechanisms for that pleasure.
What I am saying is that you can associate the two by
apparent cause and effect, but cannot prove the
physical mechanism is the reason for the pleasure
experienced by the consciousness of the person
stimulated.
>
> our thinking in this
> > consciousness
>
> physical existence tends to express
> > things
>
> I can make no sense of these phrases. You seem to
> have in mind the
> monads of Leibnitz or Bertrand Russell.
"our thinking in *this* consciousness.."
I am using the term consciousness in terms of a
vehicle. So our thinking in *this* vehicle.
In other words:
One's thoughts in a timeless-consciousness can be
organized as a temporal stream of descrete thought
frames...
"physical existence tends to express things.."
>From a mystic standpoint, the physical realm is just
one place out of many, with it's own characteristics.
One can take a a thing that is manifest in one place
one way, and bring it into the physical and have it
manifest another way.
So in other words:
Consciousness, normally timeless in expression, can be
manifest in the physical realm. In doing so (do to the
temporal nature of the physical realm) consciousness
tends to express temporally as well.
> You seem to
> have in mind the
> monads of Leibnitz or Bertrand Russell.
I have no idea who those people are, nor do I have any
clue what a "monad" is. :)
Robert W.
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Received on Sun Apr 01 2001 - 23:25:01 PDT