Re: on formally indescribable ...
Stephen Paul King wrote (some time ago):
>It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for
>the simple reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable"
>in its behaviour.
It is true that TM's can not give rise to consciousness
*in some pre-specifiable way*. (This is linked to what I call
Benacerraf insight).
This does not show that TM can not give rise to consciousness.
Only that we cannot program a TM for it being conscious.
We still can build a collection of TM's such that one of
them will be conscious although we cannot know for sure
which one.
Bruno
Received on Thu Mar 29 2001 - 07:28:56 PST
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