Jacques Mallah wrote:
>>From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>>Your problem is that you are attached to a very naive (and vague!) theory
>>of mind where the first person is attached to
>>a particular "physical" instantiation of a computation.
>>In 1988 I have build the movie-graph thought experiment (platonic
>>destructive in the James Brown's nomenclature) which shows that
>>this view is incompatible with comp. Maudlin has proved in 1989
>>an equivalent result. Unlike UDA the graph movie argument *is*
>>difficult (we discuss it at lenght in the list).
>
> We discussed it; as I said then, it's wrong.
You call it the crackpot proof :-) ("hurluberlu" in french)
> Indeed. Serious as in important. My proposal at
>http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/100y.htm
>can use refinement, so people who want to work on it can.
Good luck! People should try not getting stuck in it. But
who knows ...
> Sorry to break it to you, but you do. A physical universe is not the
>only (hypothetically real) mathematical structure that should implement
>computations. Obviously, you believe that a universal dovetailer (a single
>computation) implements all the computations it dovetails.
I don't believe that. Only the concrete (implemented) DU does that,
and then enter the "crackpot" proof, ... , or OCCAM. (see the UDA post):
there is no need for a concrete running of the DU. The word "concrete"
appears in the mouth of machine (if I can say) relatively to
stable (without wabbits!) stories. Unless you postulate the existence
of a concrete world. I don't. "The existence of a concrete universe" is
what need an explanation (for me). And with comp I got only appearances
of "The existence of a concrete universe".
*Concrete* is just *abstract* made familiar (and seen from inside).
> You also talk about "levels of substitution" and it sounds to me like
>you believe that some mathematical structure implements the conscious
>computation, with a "lower level" playing the role that "the physical world"
>would (hypothetically) play.
No. The lower levels are *defined* by the stability of my possible
conscious experiences. (I think up side down).
> If all computations exist, then the
>computations they implement should also exist. That helps determine the
>measure distribution.
Most of the computations implement parts of it, consciousness glues these
part, build covering ...
You believe in some absolute implementation level, are you not?
At least you don't believe (unless you change your mind) in the
1-person/3-person distinction, so I don't need even to try
explaining my way, do I?
Nevertheless I appreciate your implementation
concern. Unlike some physicist you are aware of difficulties there.
Bruno
Received on Sat Feb 24 2001 - 10:34:00 PST