Re: on formally describable universes and measures

From: George Levy <>
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2001 16:19:06 -0800

The exchange between Bruno and Juergens is, I believe, instructive and constructive
as it forces them to refine their positions. However, while there is a need for
some formalism, too much formalism gets in the way. As Einstein said, "Imagination
is more important than knowledge."

Juergens' insistence on being absolutely formal in defining delays, is truly
impossible unless a TOE is in place. And if we had a TOE, then we wouldn't waste
our time arguing. His constructivist approach can never achieve the required
conceptual leap.

Here is a suggestion: rather than getting bogged down with attempting to define
time and delays, wouldn't be simpler to start as Descartes did with the fundamental

assumption of the "I" or "I think" which is the primary uncontrovertible
observation and also the necessary assumption for deriving everything else. From
this observation (or assumption), use anthropic reasonning to deduce that the whole
observed world is a set of logically linked relationship.

In other words:
I think
(observation of the "I" and the "now"; I am rational, logical, I understand

therefore I am
( rationality is the definition of existence)

therefore the world is
(anthropic reasoning-- the initial boundary condition for the causal chain starts
with "I")

therefore the plenitude is
(absence of irrational and acausal arbitrariness in the description of the world
leads to all possible rational worlds)

therefore "I" exists in plural
(absence of arbitrariness leads to the existence of several differing "I's," in
fact of all possible "I's.")

Conscious flow (time) becomes a logical linkage between "I's." In other words, the
time thread from one "I" to the next, or more generally, from one "I" to several
other "I's" is constrained by the self rationality of "I." Consciousness can be
described as a web in the plenitude, linking all conscious points together.

Received on Sat Feb 17 2001 - 16:33:51 PST

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