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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Thu Feb 15 03:11:48 2001

Juergen wrote (among things):

*>But how to answer an ill-posed question? You promise that "time and
*

*>space will disappear at the end of the reasoning", but your question
*

*>is about delays, and how can we speak about delays without defining
*

*>time? Simulation time? Real time? Both? How? There is no way to continue
*

*>without formal framework.
*

We were doing a thought experiment. I haven't say that the delays were

virtual. This is done much later in the reasoning. Of course, as George

Levy says the permutation real/virtual makes no changes in the first

person point of view, and does not change the distribution either.

IF we accept COMP we survive with

an artificial brain (Well: in case we were betting on a correct level

of substitution).

That means the doctor scan (at the right level) your brain, destroy

it, and then from the recollected information he builds a new one.

The state of the artificial brain mirrors the state of your brain.

You survive (with comp!).

Now let us suppose the doctor keeps the information hidden in a drawer

during one year.

Real time delay, in the every day-type of life.

After that delay he makes the "reconstitution".

I am just saying that, with comp, from the point of view of the

one who survive, that delay cannot be perceived. It has not influence

the kept information of your brain.

*>From the first person point of view the delay introduced by the doctor
*

has not been and cannot been directly perceived.

(that's why I insist sometimes that reconstition booth has no windows!).

Are you seeing my point ? It does also not change first person perception

in case of self-multiplication.

*>There is no way to continue without formal framework.
*

I isolate a unique formalisation by an informal reasoning. To formalise

at this stage would automatically put the mind-body problem

under the rug. A TOE which doesn't address (at least) the mind-body

problem is a TOS (a theory of *some* thing).

But as I show below, those self-multiplication are easily

formalised (at least the third person description of those experiment

are easily formalised). You can easily write a program which multiplied

yourself (still betting on a correct level of course) relatively to

virtual environments.

Are you among those who argues that talk on consciousness is a hoax ?

How do you manage consciousness in your TOE-approach?

How do you relate consciousness and computation.

I'm afraid you are making "unspoken assumption" about the

mind/body/computation relation all along your work.

*>What exactly is this indeterminacy?
*

Let us reiterate the self-duplications, applied on you, 16 times.

I ask to all (2^16) Schmidhubers if they can predict the W,M

sequences appearing on their T-shirt.

Some, like WWMWWMWWWWMMMMMM will pretend that the sequence is

computable: it is indeed the beginning of the binary

developpement of PI. Most will accept it is just not computable.

To make things a little more formal, you can program that

self-multiplication, including yourself as a subroutine, and

making Washington and Moscow virtual.

In particular the UD does that. But I am still anticipating.

*>Is the distribution computable?
*

*>How does the distribution depend on your delays and other computable (?)
*

*>things?
*

The point is that the "credibility-distribution", whatever form

it will take, cannot depend, with comp, on arbitrary delays for the

reconstitutions. Nor can it depend on space, nor on any subtance ...

(I anticipate, but you can read my CC&Q paper, cf my URL below).

In another post you say:

*>Yes. My point is: as long as we are not forced by evidence, why assume
*

*>the existence of something we cannot describe or analyze in principle?
*

If I fall from a flying plane, being a realist (though not a

subtancialist) I believe I will fall somewhere, although I have

no means to describe or analyse where.

Just to see how much constructive philosopher you are,

if you have the time, tell me if you accept the

following proof ? Perhaps you know it.

Proposition: There is a couple of irrational numbers (x,y)

such that x^y is rational.

Proof: we know (since Pythagore) that sqr(2) is irrational.

Now, either (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2)) is rational, and the case is closed.

or (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2)) is irrational, but then

((sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))) ^ (sqr(2)) , which is equal to 2 (rational)

provide the solution.

So we know for sure that either (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))

or ((sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))) ^ (sqr(2)) provide the solution, although

we don't know which one. Do you accept we have nevertheless

prove that there exists couple of irrational numbers (x,y)

such that x^y is rational ?

(The problem with constructive philosophy is that there are

quite a lot of them. I am trying to find which one).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal

Received on Thu Feb 15 2001 - 03:11:48 PST

Date: Thu Feb 15 03:11:48 2001

Juergen wrote (among things):

We were doing a thought experiment. I haven't say that the delays were

virtual. This is done much later in the reasoning. Of course, as George

Levy says the permutation real/virtual makes no changes in the first

person point of view, and does not change the distribution either.

IF we accept COMP we survive with

an artificial brain (Well: in case we were betting on a correct level

of substitution).

That means the doctor scan (at the right level) your brain, destroy

it, and then from the recollected information he builds a new one.

The state of the artificial brain mirrors the state of your brain.

You survive (with comp!).

Now let us suppose the doctor keeps the information hidden in a drawer

during one year.

Real time delay, in the every day-type of life.

After that delay he makes the "reconstitution".

I am just saying that, with comp, from the point of view of the

one who survive, that delay cannot be perceived. It has not influence

the kept information of your brain.

has not been and cannot been directly perceived.

(that's why I insist sometimes that reconstition booth has no windows!).

Are you seeing my point ? It does also not change first person perception

in case of self-multiplication.

I isolate a unique formalisation by an informal reasoning. To formalise

at this stage would automatically put the mind-body problem

under the rug. A TOE which doesn't address (at least) the mind-body

problem is a TOS (a theory of *some* thing).

But as I show below, those self-multiplication are easily

formalised (at least the third person description of those experiment

are easily formalised). You can easily write a program which multiplied

yourself (still betting on a correct level of course) relatively to

virtual environments.

Are you among those who argues that talk on consciousness is a hoax ?

How do you manage consciousness in your TOE-approach?

How do you relate consciousness and computation.

I'm afraid you are making "unspoken assumption" about the

mind/body/computation relation all along your work.

Let us reiterate the self-duplications, applied on you, 16 times.

I ask to all (2^16) Schmidhubers if they can predict the W,M

sequences appearing on their T-shirt.

Some, like WWMWWMWWWWMMMMMM will pretend that the sequence is

computable: it is indeed the beginning of the binary

developpement of PI. Most will accept it is just not computable.

To make things a little more formal, you can program that

self-multiplication, including yourself as a subroutine, and

making Washington and Moscow virtual.

In particular the UD does that. But I am still anticipating.

The point is that the "credibility-distribution", whatever form

it will take, cannot depend, with comp, on arbitrary delays for the

reconstitutions. Nor can it depend on space, nor on any subtance ...

(I anticipate, but you can read my CC&Q paper, cf my URL below).

In another post you say:

If I fall from a flying plane, being a realist (though not a

subtancialist) I believe I will fall somewhere, although I have

no means to describe or analyse where.

Just to see how much constructive philosopher you are,

if you have the time, tell me if you accept the

following proof ? Perhaps you know it.

Proposition: There is a couple of irrational numbers (x,y)

such that x^y is rational.

Proof: we know (since Pythagore) that sqr(2) is irrational.

Now, either (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2)) is rational, and the case is closed.

or (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2)) is irrational, but then

((sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))) ^ (sqr(2)) , which is equal to 2 (rational)

provide the solution.

So we know for sure that either (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))

or ((sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))) ^ (sqr(2)) provide the solution, although

we don't know which one. Do you accept we have nevertheless

prove that there exists couple of irrational numbers (x,y)

such that x^y is rational ?

(The problem with constructive philosophy is that there are

quite a lot of them. I am trying to find which one).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal

Received on Thu Feb 15 2001 - 03:11:48 PST

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