Re: on formally describable universes and measures
In response to Bruno and Jesse, perhaps I should have used a different
label in the first block of my diagram to make it correspond with past
posting, as follows:
----------------------------------
--------------------
(1) | "observer" moments |<====| other postulates | (6)
--------------------
---------------------------------- /\
|
| |
|
v |
|
--------------------------- |
|
(2) | the physical world & me | |
|
--------------------------- |
|
| |
|
v |
|
--------------------------------- |
|
| descriptions of the physical | |
|
(3) | and psychological world in | |
|
| terms of mathematical laws | |
|
--------------------------------- |
|
| |
|
v |
|
--------------------------------- |
===============|
| the information content of the |
-------------------
(4) | mathematical description of |<====| other postulates | (5)
-------------------
| the world |
---------------------------------
I preferred "direct perceptions and thoughts" because they didn't
require an object "observer" which I put in quotes because, as I
indicated, I supposed that "I" (the observer) is an inference for the
patterns in the "observer moments". However, part of the reason for my
posting was that I wanted to say that all the above blocks "exist" in
different senses and it is only poetic argument to say "only observer
moments exist". It is all right to make such provacative, poetic
assertions, but they should be followed by an explanation of how all
the other blocks "seem" to exist, or exist in some other way.
As for the continuity of consciousness, I think it is clear that there
is continuity in the sense that perceptions and thoughts are not
disconnected. At the level of physical descriptions, nuerological
states have some finite duration. Even if you like to assert "the
physical world doesn't exist" your complete theory must take into
account this "appearance". These states are not disjoint, but overlap
in time. So I would say the there is continuity of consciousness but
it is not fundamental - it is contingent (having been knocked
unconscious I can attest to that directly).
Bruno has explained the "uncertainity" in his Washington-Moscow thought
experiment as one of the thoughts that I would have before being
duplicated. I would think I am uncertain as to where I will end up. I
see nothing interesting or fundamental in this. I am uncertain at this
very moment as to what I will have for lunch tomorrow. This kind of
uncertainity about the future is commonplace and has no interesting
philosophical implications. The only diffence is that if I express my
uncertainity about my Washington-Moscow future I may use a semantic
ambiguity when thinking where "I" will be when there are two "I's" and
I have failed to distinguish them.
In reading Juergen's posts and some earlier ones, I wonder whether
diagram I made would reflect his view if I added postulates (6), "The
information content of the mathematical description of the world does
not have any contingent or historical part because it is a description
of all possible (describable) worlds and so there is no need to try to
infer (2) from (3). I don't think this makes the informational content
level (4) anymore "real" than the others - but it is an interesting
project to see if one can start there and get to the other levels
(mostly by invoking the weak-anthropic principle it seems).
In a way I agree with James Higgo that this argumentation about
"consciousness" is pointless. On the other hand I don't agree that
"only observer moments exist". It may be interesting to try to start
with observer moments and see how far you can get, but if you can't get
the rest of the world - levels (1) thru (4) - and just end up logic
chopping and giving, "That's just your observer moment." as the answer
to every question, then I'd say your project had failed.
Brent Meeker
Received on Sat Feb 10 2001 - 15:39:29 PST
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0
: Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:07 PST