RE: on formally describable universes and measures (fwd)

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri Feb 9 11:25:30 2001

Brent Meeker writes:

> Bruno, perhaps I'm just unusally dense today; but I dont' grasp the
>uncertainity to you write of the the Washington-Moscow thought experiment.
>It seems obvious to me that when I am reconstituted in Washington and
>reconstituted in Moscow then I am in both places.


Remember that my question was (accepting comp, if only just for
the sake of the argument) "Where will you *feel* after the duplication?"

You *can* indeed say "I will *be* in Washington and I will *be* in
Moscow",
or "I will *be* in both places".
In that case I say you are talking about you at the third person.

But here I ask you: "Where will you *feel* being after the experiment?".
The fact is that if comp is true and if the level has been correctly
chosen, you will not feel being at both place simultaneously.
The one in Moscow will say "oh I am in Moscow" and the one in Washington
will say "oh I am in Washington". Those one which gives different
answers are what I use to call "the first person".
Unless they have some telepathic power, each of them feel distinct.
(and with comp if they displays such telepathic power, it can be show
it means the level has not been rightly chosen).

You can make it more precise by defining (in first approximation) the
first person by his diary-book. The diary-book is put in a pocket, so
that it is duplicated in the experience. It has been asked to the one who
does the experience, to write in the diary the result of
self-localisation.

With comp it is obvious (isn'it?) that no diaries will appear
with the writing of "oh I feel myself being both in W or M".

OK ? If you agree with the 1-3 distinction we can proceed.
The uncertainty comes when the person in Moscow asks him/herself
"why am I the one in Moscow, why not the one Washington?"
The experiencer realises that she/he has no means to be sure
where he/she will feel him/herself to be in the iteration of
that experience. The undeterminacy comes from there. OK ?
If after the experience they have no means to localise
themselves, they just don't know where they are.


>This of course assumes
>that there is no mystical, indivisble "soul" that is "really" me. It
>follows from the idea that my internal pyschological states derive from the
>physical processes of my body - and if the body is reproduced then so are
>those processes.

Gosh this I cannot comment now. I accept it, with the proviso that
I don't take at all the expression "physical processes" as granted.

>Perhaps you don't accept this last because you propose to derived
>physics from psychology.

No, no. I accept (essentially) 'this last'.
It is all the other way round. I say that
if we are machine (in the sense above) then physics *derives* from
psychology. Matter emerges from consciousnes.
It is not a proposition. It is the quasi-logical
conclusion of the whole thought experiment.

It would just be prematured to explain exactly what that
means. Of course the very meaning of physics and psychology change
a little bit. In a sense comp explains why matter emerges from
consciousness, and even partially how. I guess I anticipate. Sorry.

I will go because colleagues are waiting for my car !

Bruno

 
Received on Fri Feb 09 2001 - 11:25:30 PST