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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri Feb 9 03:38:41 2001

Hi Juergen,

With (classical) comp it exists a level such that we survive

a Washington-Moscou self-duplication where the reconstitution

are made at that level (WM).

(Later I will prove that no machine can ever know its correct

levels of substitution, but still a machine could guess one

correctly, and that is all we need in the reasoning).

Here is the "precise question" I promise. We agree that

in the WM self-duplication experiment there is an uncertainty

about where "I" will find myself after it has been done.

This does not mean we have chosen the uniform distribution

(P(W) = P(M) = 1/2)) to modelise this uncertainty.

Now suppose that at Moscow we delaye the reconstitution. Do

you agree it cannot change the distribution of uncertainty?

That is: whatever ways you choose to modelize the first-person

uncertainty in self-multiplication experience/experiment,

comp entails it must remain invariant with respect to

arbitrary delays introduced in the reconstitutions.

We don't know the distribution. But we know it is invariant

for the addition of delays.

Do you agree ?

Bruno

PS

1) Of course I know that you do not accept COMP, which

includes a minimal amount of arithmetical realism.

That is not a problem because I don't ask people to believe

in COMP, just to believe that my thesis shows that COMP

entails the REVERSAL. Too bad: you will miss both

the solution of the mind-body problem *and* the origin

of the physical laws.

Note that I am used to people abandoning COMP when they begin

to understand the reversal.

2) It does not mean I believe your are consistent. This

is because if you believe there is a "great programmer" I can

prove to you the existence of uncomputable functions, which

you should'nt accept with your constructive move. I guess

you know that there is no Universal Machines computing all

and only the total (or those with recursive domain) computable

functions.

Another exemple: you cannot use Lowenheim-Skolem theorem,

like in your last post, for your constructive purpose,

'cause the Lowenheim -Skolem theorem does not admit

constructive proof (and necessarily so according to a result

by McNeil and Tennant). But the biggest problem for a

constructive philosopher is the "other mind" problem. A

constructivist cannot really believe in another "person",

still less understand the 1/3-person differences.

A constructivist approach of the mind-body problem leads

necessarily toward solipsism.

Received on Fri Feb 09 2001 - 03:38:41 PST

Date: Fri Feb 9 03:38:41 2001

Hi Juergen,

With (classical) comp it exists a level such that we survive

a Washington-Moscou self-duplication where the reconstitution

are made at that level (WM).

(Later I will prove that no machine can ever know its correct

levels of substitution, but still a machine could guess one

correctly, and that is all we need in the reasoning).

Here is the "precise question" I promise. We agree that

in the WM self-duplication experiment there is an uncertainty

about where "I" will find myself after it has been done.

This does not mean we have chosen the uniform distribution

(P(W) = P(M) = 1/2)) to modelise this uncertainty.

Now suppose that at Moscow we delaye the reconstitution. Do

you agree it cannot change the distribution of uncertainty?

That is: whatever ways you choose to modelize the first-person

uncertainty in self-multiplication experience/experiment,

comp entails it must remain invariant with respect to

arbitrary delays introduced in the reconstitutions.

We don't know the distribution. But we know it is invariant

for the addition of delays.

Do you agree ?

Bruno

PS

1) Of course I know that you do not accept COMP, which

includes a minimal amount of arithmetical realism.

That is not a problem because I don't ask people to believe

in COMP, just to believe that my thesis shows that COMP

entails the REVERSAL. Too bad: you will miss both

the solution of the mind-body problem *and* the origin

of the physical laws.

Note that I am used to people abandoning COMP when they begin

to understand the reversal.

2) It does not mean I believe your are consistent. This

is because if you believe there is a "great programmer" I can

prove to you the existence of uncomputable functions, which

you should'nt accept with your constructive move. I guess

you know that there is no Universal Machines computing all

and only the total (or those with recursive domain) computable

functions.

Another exemple: you cannot use Lowenheim-Skolem theorem,

like in your last post, for your constructive purpose,

'cause the Lowenheim -Skolem theorem does not admit

constructive proof (and necessarily so according to a result

by McNeil and Tennant). But the biggest problem for a

constructive philosopher is the "other mind" problem. A

constructivist cannot really believe in another "person",

still less understand the 1/3-person differences.

A constructivist approach of the mind-body problem leads

necessarily toward solipsism.

Received on Fri Feb 09 2001 - 03:38:41 PST

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