Marchal wrote:
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
> >Last night I finally got around to reading Bruno's CCQ paper and
> >Juergen's Algo TOE paper. Thanks for the citation guys.
> >
> >Bruno, its a bit unfair that you lump me in with Schmidhuber in your
> >criticism in footnote 9. (I agree your criticism is fair of
> >Schmidhuber's approach BTW). It indicates that you missed the point of
> >section 3 of my Occam paper - are you using the second (latest)
> >version of this paper? I substantially revised sections 3 & 4.
>
> oh ! Sorry, I will load it again.
>
> >I do not assume we are inhabiting a well defined universe amongst all
> >possible - quite the opposite in fact. The UTM used for defining the
> >Universal Prior is that of the observer erself. In fact, one doesn't
> >need a UTM at all - all that suffices is an observer that equivalences
> >descriptions. The measure of a description is simply the ratios of
> >equivalence class sizes. (see my new Complexity and Emergence paper
> >for my point on effective complexity).
>
> Equivalence description of what ? I guess you explain that in the
> new Complexity and Emergence paper. You don't need an UTM ?
I think you're having difficulty parsing my english. "Equivalence" is a
verb, and "descriptions" are the object. One has an ensemble (possibly
even a set) of descriptions, that is divided up into equivalence
classes by the observer. Any means of cutting an infinite set of
discrete objects into a finite set of classes will do - it needn't be
a UTM.
>
> >In section 3, the uncountable
> >random universes are equivalenced to their indistinguishable law-like
> >universe. White Rabbit universes, also have their own cloud of random
> >variations, but the whole cloud must have lower measure.
>
> I "feel" that correct ...
>
> >
> >I don't deliberately ignore the distinction between 1st and 3rd person
> >viewpoints - in "Occams razor", I'm only dealing with 1st person
> >viewpoints. I'm ignoring the possibility of whether there even is a
> >3rd person viewpoint.
>
> But for communication, I suppose you agree that you are using 3rd person
> description (implicitely).
>
No - I explicitly use the first person (although in order to get the
stuff published do not make a big deal about it). See my statement to
the effect that the UTM is defined by the observer (In Occam, I assume
that all observers can implement UTMs - a sort of moderate strength
Church-Turing thesis - but as mentioned above, this is not strictly
necessary). I remain, as ever, agnostic on the subject of whether
there is an absolute UTM that might define a 3rd person description
(contra Schmidhuber, who assume that this absolute UTM exists).
> >
> >Incidently, in your "Hunting the White Rabbit (I)", I like your use of
> >the Feynman path metaphor. The destructive interference of long
> >Feynman paths in some sense corresponds to the way that random strings
> >are equivalenced by an observer.
>
> If you prove that, then you deserve a prize. My feeling (unfortunately
> it's just a feeling) is that the 1-person point of view obliges us to
> take Levy Characteristic function (in probability theory) more
> seriously. It is at this point that Fourier transform could be used
> to link information and computation .... I am just dreaming aloud ...
>
I'm not sure in what sense you mean prove... I read this section of
your paper as though it were a metaphor.
> >
> >Juergen's paper makes many interesting contributions into different
> >types of measures, definitely a step forward. I would criticise it on
> >two grounds: a) assumption that the universe is running on a
> >particular machine, ala my Occam's razor critique, and Bruno's
> >critique, and b) the assumption of COMP - ie uncomputable objects such
> >as random numbers are unecessary for consciousness.
>
> Hola ! Remember that I mean by COMP the fact of surviving with an
> artificial digital brain. And then ... I show that uncomputable objects
> are necessary or at least unavoidable ... This is the main point where
> Schmidhuber and me disagree. (This is also the main consequence of the
> UDA thought experiment). The probabilities are defined on infinite
> (continuous) set of infinite histories.
>
Yes - I think a few of us are confused about COMP - including
myself. I suspect that we really need a comp_1 and comp_2, where
comp_1 means consciousness is directly emulable by a Turing machine,
and comp_2 means consciousness may be embedded in a multiverse type
emulable by a TM, using a UD type algorithm to provide the
noncomputable features such as random numbers. If I understand your
UDA correctly, we get something like:
COMP => comp_2 => not comp_1
My objections are primarily against comp_1, (which is, of course,
Schmidhuber's position), not comp_2.
I'm just thinking aloud here - comments appreciated...
> >This assumption
> >leads to specific predictions, such as beta decay having hidden pseudo
> >random correllations, and (forgive if I'm wrong) the prediction that
> >quantum computing will fail.
> >
> >Note that in my Occam paper, I explicity assume that randomness is
> >needed for consciousness, and that the mechanism for producing it
> >(with respectable measure) is to embed the observer in a
> >Multiverse. This is why I end up with conventional QM. But then, I
> >have always been critical of COMP.
> >
> >Could Juergen's work lead to falsifiability of COMP?
>
> I am not sure. (Juergen would also doubt that).
> But, actually, my work *could* lead to the falsifiability of COMP.
> It is that point most people appreciated in my reasoning (for
> exemple Gilles Henri's post in this list!).
> But concluding that comp is false from my work is well to early,
> IMO, and honestly I would not bet on that.
>
> Bruno
>
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Received on Wed Feb 07 2001 - 18:37:49 PST