Re: on formally describable universes and measures

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue Jan 30 02:25:13 2001

George Levy said:
>
>>First person observation of consciousness is the self observing the self, or
>>possibly part of the self observing other parts of the self.
>
>Let me add to this previous post the following, which is relevant in the
>context
>of the MWI.
>
>Any object can be viewed from the first person or from the third person
>perspective. Let me explain.
>
>If the object does not exert any contingency on the existence of the
>observer, then
>the first and third person perspectives coincide.
>
>If the object does have a contingency on the existence of the observer,
>then the
>first and third person perspectives diverge. For example, let's say that
>the object
>is a randomly detonated bomb. If the bomb is located under your seat,
>then it has
>a contingency on your continued existence and therefore your observation
>will be
>first person: you will not see the bomb explode. If on the other hand, the
>bomb is
>located far away, then your observation will be third person and you might
>see it
>explode.
>
>It also follows that different observers in different contingency frames of
>reference experience different first person observations of the same object.
>
>Following this reasonning we could surmise that even some of the natural laws
>themselves as well as the absence of white rabbits could be first person
>effects.
>Any violation to those laws and the appearance of white rabbits would
>imply the
>immediate disappearance of the observer. For example any change to the
>charge/mass
>of electrons would be "global" and result in the immediate destruction of
>the world
>as we know it. Therefore the stability of the electron could be a first
>person
>effect.

I agree, basically. The problem is that the appearance of a white rabbits
does not imply the immediate disappearance of the observer, because there
is nothing inconsistent with white rabbits or flying pigs.
For exemple if you see a white rabbits in a dream, not only you don't
disappear but you find that completely normal (unless you are a lucid
dreamer trained in noticing inconsistencies).
I agree, though, that the stability of the electron is a first person
effect, even a first person plural one (hopefully).
But the hunting of the white rabbits is not terminated and we must still
explain, a la Feynman, why the so many consistent but weird dreams done
by the UD "interfere destructively".
Your explanation would work if the comp-substitution-level was
necessarily electronic, which I doubt.

Bruno
Received on Tue Jan 30 2001 - 02:25:13 PST