>From: hal.domain.name.hidden
>The issue of what constitutes an implementation is complex and difficult to
>understand unless you have read the relevant papers as background.
>Hopefully your audience is familiar with the issue otherwise your paper is
>hard to understand.
Hopefully the people familiar with it will read my paper.
>All these physically-oriented proposals have an ad hoc flavor, an
>attempt to "cook the books" to get the answers we want. They do not
>flow naturally from first principles.
I think it's too soon to judge that. Most new ideas take several
iterations before they start to look simple enough to have been discovered
with just a little thought.
>The overall program you are proposing is defined here:
>
> Suppose, hypothetically, that the problems in defining a unique and
>proper implementation criterion can be overcome. The next step in applying
>computationalism to quantum mechanics would then be to see if the
>appearance of the standard rules for probability could be derived using the
>wavefunction without collapse.
> Such probabilities would only be effective probabilities, because there
>is nothing non-deterministic in the model to be considered. An effective
>probability in this context is defined as the ratio of the number of
>observations of a given type to the total number of observations. In this
>case, this will be a ratio of the number of implementations of a
>computation of a given conscious type to the number of implementations
>summed over all conscious types.
>
>As a practical matter, this plan has so many obstacles to overcome that it
>looks hopeless. Not only do you have to resolve the issue of when an
>implementation has occured (which is of doubtful success),
How about the proposals in the paper about that?
>you then need to define what class of computations constitute conscious
>observers suitable to your needs. This second problem is equally
>contentious and far from resolution today.
I don't think that would need to be solved just to derive the
probabilities. It should be possible to show that, for a large class of
computations (which should include the brain-type ones), the ratio of (of
|+> type to |-> type, for example) comes out right with the appropriate
quantum system. Or, it could be shown for a toy model and an argument made
that the model has enough of the right features to imply that a realistic
model would be similar.
>This struck me as funny:
>
>A disturbing possibility is that the measure of a brain (the # of ways in
>which it could be said to implement its regular computation) could depend
>on the size or structure of the brain. It is conceivable, for example, that
>a creature could be constructed which thinks like a human, but whose brain
>does not implement its computation, as mathematically defined, in nearly as
>many ways. Such a creature would be at great risk of enslavement by regular
>humans. The opposite scenario would also be possible. It is to be hoped
>that measure is not sensitive to the details of the construction of a
>brain.
>
>Presumably your concern is that if people come to believe that a
>particular creature's brain has less measure than others, we should care
>less about the welfare of that creature, and so would feel comfortable in
>enslaving it, since its suffering wouldn't matter. It seems absurd to
>imagine that the majority of people would allow these untestable
>philosophical musings to drive their ethical judgement on such an important
>issue.
I guess you never heard of religion, communism, or other ideologies.
Ideas can matter. I think it is quite possible that it could happen.
Remember, Christianity didn't amount to much at first. If androids were
commonplace, so would be computationalist philosophy.
>Anyway, even if it happened, by your own arguments, mistreatment would be
>justified, hence there is no reason to hope for the contrary.
I certainly don't think it would be a good thing.
Actually, what could happen is that it will be shown that measure *is*
sensitive to construction - but, it will be too hard (or controversial) to
actually determine which type of creature is the one with much greater
measure. Fine, you say, we'll just treat everyone equally?
Sorry, no. If I believe the measure ratio is huge, Bayesian reasoning
tells me my type of brain probably is the one with more measure. The other
side, will reach the mirror image conclusion. A perfect justification for
racial war or power-based slavery. (The slaves, of course, being perfectly
justified in wanting to revolt; the system could be unstable.)
That's why we need to worry about this stuff now - before the other side
has been built. And this century might be when that starts. (The doomsday
argument, anyone? Replacement by near-zombies would be almost the same as
regular doom.) These ideas will be understood one day; even if people don't
pursue this line of reasoning, robots might. Now, I like robots and I hope
the problem of size will be shown not to be a problem.
Finally, if measure is sensitive, then most likely some humans would
have more than others ... not good.
>Overall I think there are interesting ideas here, but the problem
>that it is working towards is so difficult that I don't think it can
>succeed as a practical matter. Some QM approaches such as "many minds" try
>to accomplish much the same task without hoping to solve all these
>insurmountable philosophical problems. They look for wavefunction splits
>that provide basic properties that would allow for causality, consistency,
>memory, etc. These are simpler principles and more likely to put practical
>and meaningful constraints on wave function decomposition.
I'm not quite sure what you're taliking about here. The CWI is a
many-minds interpretation of sorts, but without the cheesy "minds as hidden
variables".
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jackmallah.domain.name.hidden)
Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/
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Received on Mon Jan 08 2001 - 19:36:47 PST