Re: The Anthropic Principle Boundary Conditions

From: <GSLevy.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2000 18:51:38 EDT

In a message dated 06/02/2000 10:39:15 AM Pacific Daylight Time,
jackmallah.domain.name.hidden writes:

> --- GSLevy.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> > jackmallah.domain.name.hidden writes:
> > > what you experience is an observer-moment.
> >
> > So you admit that the observer moment is to be
> > experienced, precisely what I said about the "I."
> > Are you saying that the first step in understanding
> > the world is subjective? If you do, then we agree:
> > "I think" = observer-moment = subjective
> experience.
>
> I don't know what you mean by subjective. If by
> "subjective" you mean "pertaining to a particular
> observer-moment", than an observer-moment would
> qualify. But keep in mind that other observer-moments
> exist, that they are just as real, and that the ratio
> of numbers of different types of such is a feature of
> the objective reality.

You are expounding here the concept of objective reality, almost as if your
"other observer-moments" could exist independently of observers.

> But I don't think by "I" you mean an
> observer-moment, since then you would deny QTI.

I think that in some respect we are close to agreeing on the equivalence of
observer-moment and "I." In any case, it is worth trying to find out how we
differ. We must work out a few things.

First the name itself "observer-moment" presupposes the concept of time. It
implies a infinitesimally thin slice of space-time with dt-> 0. (i.e.,
moment). I find it difficult to believe that such an entity could be the
"atom" of cognition. I rather work out with a slice in logical space than a
slice in space-time. By slice in logical space, I mean a slice involving a
single elementary logical process. In this respect I am leaning toward the
approach advanced by Bruno, that physics should be a branch of psychology.


> > If the world was wabbity then some elements of the
> > world would exist with absolutely no reason at all.
> > ... My earlier post deriving the existence of
> > the Plenitude using the rationality of the world as
> > a starting point would be irrelevent and therefore
> > irrationality would preclude the need for the
> > Plenitude. The Copenhagen school would actually
> > advocate the simplest approach to QM.
>
> I don't think so. It depends on what you use to
> decide what "simplest" means of course. My approach
> is algorithmic complexity, but as I have said, with
> that criterion for Occam's razor, no possible
> observation would falsify the AUH. Even the most
> wabbitty observation would still bear witness to the
> likelihood that it is not due to a coincidence of
> nature, but is instead one of many.

I agree 100% with you that "no possible observation would falsify the AUH."
If we make a wabbity observation there are three ways to go:

1) Deny that the observation is wabbity and keep looking for a cause in the
world which is accessible to us. This approach which may lead to infinite
causal regress may not be falsifiable on practical grounds.

2) Declare that this observation has no cause. This is the Copenhagen school.
It denies the possibility that the world could have a completely rational
basis. In the absence of rationality, falsifiability becomes a moot point.

3) Declare that the observation is symmetrical with its opposite in a
completely inaccessible world. This approach would conserve symmetry and
rationality but is not falsifiable on theoretical grounds. Somehow the MWI
does not seem to fall under this case. Even though those other worlds are
"inaccessible" we do get experimental evidence that they exist and we do use
those worlds (as in quantum computing for example). Something is missing. How
can we be aware of and affected by worlds which are inaccessible? I believe
that the missing link has to do with the ability of consciousness to span
several of the MWs. I.e., consciousness has "thickness" across worlds? Is
there a relationship between this "thickness" and Planck's constant? I don't
know enough about physics to pursue this line of reasonning.


> --- GSLevy.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> > Yet, the root of all knowledge must start with the
> > basic assumption about the self, about our
> > own rationality and about our own observations. I
> > agree that it makes sense to talk about 3rd person,
> > but only as a derived or deduced fact from the
> > first person perspective.
>
> It's deduced from known facts, which is the
> observer-moment. (Technically, from the memory + laws
> of the brain *at each step*. The brain can follow
> many steps of computation; while each observer-moment
> sees only one, later observer-moments can benefit from
> the results of the calculation done by the brain
> earlier

You are really much closer here to my logical space slice idea than to the
space-time slice concept.


just as they can benefit from books previously
> read by the brain written by other people entirely or
> by a lucky coincidence of cosmic rays which implants
> false memories. Computationalism asserts that such a
> brain is conscious, but other schools of thought would
> make a distinction such that, for example, a zombie
> brain would still make the same deductions as a
> conscious brain.

This confusion originates from the fact that the perception of consciousness
is relativistic and tied to the frame of reference of the observer. From my
perspective, the zombie/non-zombie paradox is a red herring. Computationalism
+ Relativity would breeze through this problem.

Even with computationalism, a
> distinction must be maintained between the physical
> system (wavefunction of brain) and observers, because
> such a wavefunction can give rise to multiple distinct
> observer-moments at the same time, and that number
> (measure) can vary with time.)
>
> > Saying that (physical) computationalism is
> > (anthropically) emergent from consciousness is a
> > first person statement. I am referring here to the
> > fact that the world is rational -- seems to be
> > simulatable on a computer.
>
> That's not what computationalism means.

OK.
>

George
Received on Sat Jun 03 2000 - 15:56:07 PDT