Re: The Anthropic Principle Boundary Conditions

From: <GSLevy.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 28 May 2000 17:47:12 EDT

In a message dated 05/26/2000 11:29:12 PM Pacific Daylight Time,
meekerdb.domain.name.hidden writes:

>
>
> >> > I don't understand your statement about complexity.
> >>
> >> Why not? Complexity = Kolmogorov complexity. I
> >> am comparing two cases:
> >> 1) A typical observation (modelled as a bitstring)
> >> drawn from, e.g., a UD with computationalism. Simple
> >> "apparent laws of physics" are said to be favored by
> >> this.
> >> 2) A typical observation, as above, but drawn
> >> instead from a set with equal weight for all
> >> anthropically valid possible observations, of the same
> >> size (same bitstring length) as above. This should be
> >> more "wabbitty"; the question is how to define that.
> >
> > We are really really not on the same wavelength. I am guessing the
> following:
> > According to you, your 1) (a UD with computationalism) can be found
> > independently of Anthropic filtering. According to me it can't.
> > Computationalism of the world is the result of Anthropic filtering with
> > computationalism of the mind of the observer as a boundary condition. So
> your
> > 1) and your 2) are, according to me, identical.
> >
> > If I attempt to keep your 2) as such and redefine your 1) as a totally
> random
> > world (without necessarily computationalism) then there should be lots of
> > wabbits in that world. I guess the information encoded in its laws of
> physics
> > would be close to zero. So 1) would be more wabbitty than 2).
>
> I think Jaque is just saying that: 1) worlds of low complexity are those
> that are
> described by a few consistent laws and exceptions add complexity while, on
> the
> other hand, 2) worlds with observers will have to be more complex than
those
> with the simplest physics and without the constraint of being law-like
could
> be
> very much more complex, i.e. wabbity. The question is, "Can observers
exist
> in
> a wabbity world?". Logically, I don't see why not. But unless there is at
> least a somewhat consistent physics they could not be 'rational' observers
> in
> the sense required by the WAP.
>

I read an article in one of the Science magazines recently, possibly Science
News or New Scientist that related the complexity of an environment to how
interesting it is. The article concludes that the most interesting results
are achieved when the environment is neither too simple nor too complex. In
terms of our discussion, we can imagine a computable (simulatable) Universe
with laws described by a bit string such as (0,0,0,0,0,0...0) in which
nothing happens. Similiarly if the bit string is totally random, nothing is
going to happen either. The best results are obtained with a middle of the
road complexity.

It is very easy to simulate an environment with such intermediate complexity
using the game "Minesweeper" in the Windows Accessories. Run "Minesweeper"
and select pull down menu "Game". Select "Custom". Set Height= 24, Width = 30
(These are the maximum values for the game area 24x30 = 720) Now set the
number of Mines = 60. This is close to a critical number for the mine density
(60/720 = 1/12). Then play the game. If you are lucky enough not to hit a
mine the first time you play, the mine free area will barely propagate to the
edges of the board. The most interesting patterns are generated when the mine
number approximately = 60. Lower mine density produces smaller patterns.
Higher mine density limits the propagation of the mine-free area.

This is an extremely simple example, but we could possibly compare the
propagaton of life in our universe, to the propagation and size of the
patterns in the Minesweeper game.

A puzzle for the reader: Derive mathematically the value for the critical
mine density showing why it is close to the experimental value of 1/12.



> >> > >
> >> > > No, it's not simplest, and you still haven't
> >> > > defined it or "yourself".
> >> > >
> >> > We went through that many times. I draw the line as
> >> > tightly around myself.. my mind as I can. "I
> >> > think,"this is my starting point. You don't have
> >> any.
> >>
> >> You still haven't defined "I", and the fact that
> >> we've discussed it many times without me getting a
> >> straight answer from you is not an excuse for you.
> >> As for my starting point, as I've said repeatedly,
> >> it's my observer-moment.
> >>
> > You can't prove observer-moment without going through "I think" first.
And
> I
> > don't need to, nor know how to define "I." I experience it.
> >
> > Could we please resolve our differences simply by saying that observer-
> moment
> > is the same as "I think?" Thank you.
> >
> > George


I think I am going to withdraw this offer. Observer-moment is implicitely
objective, "I think" is implicitly subjective. Just like oil and water. They
don't mix. We cannot prove the objective world until we accept our subjective
thoughts and observations. So, I insist, "I think" comes first.

I this respect, I agree with Bruno Marchal about basing physics on (machine)
psychology. I also go further than him by defining our mental machinery
(axioms and rules..and neural functions) as a (relativistic) frame of
reference.

George


> Definitions always have to stop with undefined terms. Where is not
crucial
> so
> long as we can understand one another.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
>
Received on Sun May 28 2000 - 14:52:19 PDT