Jacques Mallah wrote:
>
> --- Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > I can see why Jacques is an enthusiastic supporter
> > of the notion that our entire experience is a
> > single "observer moment" unconnected with
> > any others. For one thing, if it were true, his
> > argument against QTI would work i.e. the observer
> > moment we do see would need to be proximally
> > maximal - ie of high relative probability in the
> > space of all such observer moments. This would rule
> > out experiencing observer moments of advanced age.
>
> Did it ever occur to you that I might actually
> believe what I say? I'm not a politician to need
> ulterior motives for everything.
I don't think I ever implied you were a politician: (arm flings into a
salute, heels click bag, and the words Zig Heil rise from my throat :)
>
> > On a side note, can anyone explain to me why the
> > observer moment should be of someone in their mid-
> > thirties, rather than of a baby in its first six
> > months of life? Such infant observer moments are
> > probably the simplest compatible with conscious
> > existence, and hence the most probable.
>
> I doubt the difference in complexity is
> significant, although there is a difference in depth.
> At any rate, you shouldn't consider here observers who
> can't use the internet because this list filters them
> out.
Maybe, although this does come down to exactly how the Anthropic
Principle is supposed to work. Does one require a PhD as a minimum to
understand the AP, hence this filters out anyone under 20 or so??
>
> > I have tended to react with charges of solipsism to
> > this idea, mainly because its seems that some of its
> > proponents are unwilling to follow through on the
> > ideas consequences, and rather dismiss them as
> > meaningless questions. This is like the solipsist
> > argument that the real doesn't actually exists, so
> > there is no point discussing it
>
> Even if that were true, and it's not, it wouldn't
> make any sense to make a charge of solipcism based on
> such a weak analogy with the behavior of the
> proponents.
>
> > So lets follow up on some of the consequences:
>
> Bring it on.
>
> > The idea of "observer moment" initially presupposes
> > that the moment has no temporal duration - it is
> > instantaneous. The problem with this, is that there
> > is no time whatsoever in which the observer can
> > experience its moment. In particular, the observer
> > is unable to implement a Turing machine, hence
> > computationalism is false.
>
> One word: huh? What are you talking about?
Computationalism requires time in order to compute the observation. No
time, no computation.
>
> > (Incidently, there are two converse assertions
> > making up computationalism. That Turing
> > computability is necessary and sufficient for
> > consciousness.
>
> That's not what computationalism says.
> Computationalism says that certain computations, if
> implemented, give rise to consciousness. It does not
> say that computability is necessary. A physical
> system that lacks computability can still implement
> computations. It is certainly not sufficient since
> not all computations are conscious.
Huh? In my books, the property of computability means being able to
perform computations. The property of emulability means that a
UTM can compute a given object. Perhaps I'm employing terms in a
different way to other people, in which case I'd be happy to be
enlightened.
If a computation can be conscious, then any Universal Turing Machine
can perform the computation, and be conscious. Therefore, you are
saying computability is sufficient for consciousness. I understood
that conputationalism also required that computability be necessary
for consciousness, ie that any conscious entity can emulate a UTM.
> In addition, if one is a dualist, one can believe
> that psychophysical laws link computations to
> consciousness. I'm a reductionist, which means I
> think that's BS. But the dualism/reductionism debate
> is orthogonal to computationalism.
>
> > The latter clause, sufficiency, is actually a
> > very strong form of the CT-thesis, and personally, I
> > don't believe it. Consequently, I would describe
> > myself as a semi-computationalist!
>
> You can stop doing so.
>
> > However, even semi-computationlism is false if this
> > single observer moment is durationless.)
>
> I don't see your point. The observer doesn't
> implement a computation; the physical system does.
What physical system? I thought you were asserting that an observer
moments are all that exist, unconnected with each other.
> For a fixed mapping, it transitions between formal
> states at some instant. Thus, for a fixed mapping,
> there are a finite number of formal clock steps per
> unit physical time, and the transitions are
> instantaneous but it dwells for some period in the
> formal states. What's the problem?
Again, what time? I thought you were in denial about time!
>
> > In a quantum history view of the world, the lack of
> > extremely aged observations does not contradict QTI
> > (Jacques' argument).
>
> Why not? While I'm not quite sure what you mean
> by a "quantum history", I am quite sure your statement
> is false.
I have explained to you before about what a quantum history is. Your
argument (against QTI) only works when the sampling of observer
moments is independent. When there is a history involved, the sampling
is most definitely not independent. I am the age I am because I have a
history of sampling 30+ years worth of observer moments. In twenty
years time I can amend that statement to 50+ years.
>
>
> =====
> - - - - - - -
> Jacques Mallah (jackmallah.domain.name.hidden)
> Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/
>
> __________________________________________________
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> http://im.yahoo.com/
>
>
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Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Mon May 15 2000 - 20:44:03 PDT