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From: Jacques M. Mallah <jqm1584.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat, 18 Mar 2000 19:38:00 -0500 (EST)

On 10 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:

*> Jacques M. Mallah wrote:
*

*> >> I keep telling you that I *do* take into account the number of copies.
*

*> >
*

*> > Maybe you take it into account, but regardless of how you describe
*

*> >your views, it's clear that you don't take it to be directly proportional.
*

*>
*

*>
*

*> I am open to direct proportionality, it is not yet proved, nor even
*

*> clearly
*

*> defined. With UD* the domains of uncertainty are at least (with n-steps
*

*> histories for any integers n) infinite countable. So you should tell me
*

*> what mean "direct proportionality" here.
*

I covered this in another thread: take the _limit_ as n goes to

infinity.

*> >> > What I must explain is my now-experience. It is plausibly one of
*

*> >> >many experiences that exist, both similar and at different times, and less
*

*> >> >similar and in different people.
*

*> >>
*

*> >> OK.
*

*> >
*

*> > Well, if you agree with that statement it's a major admission on
*

*> >your part. From now on you're not allowed to claim that linkage of
*

*> >experiences over time is a problem or the like.
*

*>
*

*> I don't see why. To explain the now-experience from the possible
*

*> inference of machines (or SAS) which are "reconstituted" sparsely in UD*,
*

*> you need to explain my now-belief in (at least apparence of) time space
*

*> and
*

*> energy without using these concepts. I never see a problem with the
*

*> linkage
*

*> of experiences over time, for time is a construct of atemporal possible
*

*> (consistent) experiences. The same for space, matter, and any
*

*> physicalist predicates. CF the 1-invariance assertions in UDA.
*

So you seem to agree that you only see one

observer-moment. That's a good step toward rejecting QTI using the

measure argument.

*> > As usual you don't understand much. To be mortal, the expectation
*

*> >value over the measure distribution (of observer-moments) for your age
*

*> >must be finite, that's all.
*

*>
*

*> Perhaps I could understand if you were a little more explicit.
*

Huh? That was explicit. A little bit wrong though. A better

criterion, now that I think of it, is that for any finite age 'a', the

effective probability that an immortal is younger than that is zero.

(Note the difference - using the first criterion, a measure

(effective probability) disribution decay that goes as 1/t^2 would be

considered immortal, but with the new criterion it is considered mortal.)

(By 'age' I of course am assuming that the observer can estimate,

if it is sufficiently small, the length of time that the laws of physics

would imply that his computer-brain has been operating for; more usefully,

the number of clock steps that it had performed. Here I do not mean to

imply that the _same_ observer must have existed at all of the

observer-moments the brain would give rise to, as that is a matter of

semantics.)

- - - - - - -

Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)

Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate

"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum

My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Received on Sat Mar 18 2000 - 16:44:57 PST

Date: Sat, 18 Mar 2000 19:38:00 -0500 (EST)

On 10 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:

I covered this in another thread: take the _limit_ as n goes to

infinity.

So you seem to agree that you only see one

observer-moment. That's a good step toward rejecting QTI using the

measure argument.

Huh? That was explicit. A little bit wrong though. A better

criterion, now that I think of it, is that for any finite age 'a', the

effective probability that an immortal is younger than that is zero.

(Note the difference - using the first criterion, a measure

(effective probability) disribution decay that goes as 1/t^2 would be

considered immortal, but with the new criterion it is considered mortal.)

(By 'age' I of course am assuming that the observer can estimate,

if it is sufficiently small, the length of time that the laws of physics

would imply that his computer-brain has been operating for; more usefully,

the number of clock steps that it had performed. Here I do not mean to

imply that the _same_ observer must have existed at all of the

observer-moments the brain would give rise to, as that is a matter of

semantics.)

- - - - - - -

Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)

Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate

"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum

My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Received on Sat Mar 18 2000 - 16:44:57 PST

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