On 10 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Jacques M. Mallah wrote:
> >> I keep telling you that I *do* take into account the number of copies.
> >
> > Maybe you take it into account, but regardless of how you describe
> >your views, it's clear that you don't take it to be directly proportional.
>
>
> I am open to direct proportionality, it is not yet proved, nor even
> clearly
> defined. With UD* the domains of uncertainty are at least (with n-steps
> histories for any integers n) infinite countable. So you should tell me
> what mean "direct proportionality" here.
I covered this in another thread: take the _limit_ as n goes to
infinity.
> >> > What I must explain is my now-experience. It is plausibly one of
> >> >many experiences that exist, both similar and at different times, and less
> >> >similar and in different people.
> >>
> >> OK.
> >
> > Well, if you agree with that statement it's a major admission on
> >your part. From now on you're not allowed to claim that linkage of
> >experiences over time is a problem or the like.
>
> I don't see why. To explain the now-experience from the possible
> inference of machines (or SAS) which are "reconstituted" sparsely in UD*,
> you need to explain my now-belief in (at least apparence of) time space
> and
> energy without using these concepts. I never see a problem with the
> linkage
> of experiences over time, for time is a construct of atemporal possible
> (consistent) experiences. The same for space, matter, and any
> physicalist predicates. CF the 1-invariance assertions in UDA.
So you seem to agree that you only see one
observer-moment. That's a good step toward rejecting QTI using the
measure argument.
> > As usual you don't understand much. To be mortal, the expectation
> >value over the measure distribution (of observer-moments) for your age
> >must be finite, that's all.
>
> Perhaps I could understand if you were a little more explicit.
Huh? That was explicit. A little bit wrong though. A better
criterion, now that I think of it, is that for any finite age 'a', the
effective probability that an immortal is younger than that is zero.
(Note the difference - using the first criterion, a measure
(effective probability) disribution decay that goes as 1/t^2 would be
considered immortal, but with the new criterion it is considered mortal.)
(By 'age' I of course am assuming that the observer can estimate,
if it is sufficiently small, the length of time that the laws of physics
would imply that his computer-brain has been operating for; more usefully,
the number of clock steps that it had performed. Here I do not mean to
imply that the _same_ observer must have existed at all of the
observer-moments the brain would give rise to, as that is a matter of
semantics.)
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Sat Mar 18 2000 - 16:44:57 PST