2009/9/18 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
>> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
>> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
>> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
>> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc?
>
> Standard CTM holds that tokens of computation are identical to
> tokens of physical activity, so they have whatever causal
> powers their physical realisers have.
What are the ontological consequences for materialism of such a view
of computational-physical identity? Is there a logically or
contingently possible material world that contains structurally
identical computational zombies, in your view?
David
>
>
>
> On 17 Sep, 17:35, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> 2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden>:
>>
>> > Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
>> > Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
>> > more general:
>>
>> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
>> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
>> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
>> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
>> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc?
>
> Standard CTM holds that tokens of computation are identical to
> tokens of physical activity, so they have whatever causal
> powers their physical realisers have.
>
> >
>
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Received on Fri Sep 18 2009 - 12:35:25 PDT