On 17 Sep 2009, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
>
> 2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>> Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including
>> Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is
>> more general:
>
> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal
> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed
> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed
> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect
> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc? I have the feeling in advance
> that you may say something that will re-define or negate the question
> rather than answer it directly, but no matter, I'm still interested.
> I suppose I'm asking what comp says about the relation between direct
> first person experience (as opposed to formulations of belief and
> other propositional or dispositional factors) and action in the third
> person sphere.
The direct phenomenal experience belongs to the non communicable or
non believable part of the gap between G and G*, or their intensional
variants. This is close to Descartes' idea that (put in a modern way)
consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt.
There is of course no closure of the physical, given that the physical
does not exist "ontologically": it is a production of the mind of the
universal numbers (relatively to addition and multiplication). In
particular consciousness is not epiphenomenal at all: its role is in
self-speeding up universal being relatively to their most probable
(normal) computational computation. This can be related to Gödel and
Blum speed-up theorem in computer science.
Your question is very vast. Hope this can help. We may come back on
this if we progress in the seventh step serie thread and beyond. I
search a way to explain this without being technical, but when I do
that, I realize Plato and Plotinus has already done that, in a way;
and today, it just look a bit shocking because it is hard to abandon
the Aristotelianist constructions.
I know that what I say is unbelievable. Indeed I show why it has to be
unbelievable. That is why I insist so much on the fact that saying yes
to the doctor ask for an act of faith, then all what I say becomes
relatively explainable from that act of faith.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Fri Sep 18 2009 - 09:10:35 PDT