2009/9/14 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>> They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is all
>> what is used.
>
> You mean they exist Platonically. For formlalists,
> such "existence" is a mere metaphor and has
> no metaphyscial consequences.
I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
Platonically, other than that different labels are being used. What
precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does not,
and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you help, Peter?
David
>
>
>
> On 13 Sep, 09:02, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> On 12 Sep 2009, at 16:42, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> >> On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> >> Once you say "yes" to the doctor, there is a clear sense in which
>> >> "you" (that is your third person relative computational state, the
>> >> one
>> >> the doctor digitalizes) exist in arithmetic, or exist arithmetically,
>> >> and this in infinite exemplars, relatively to an infinity of
>> >> universal
>> >> numbers which executes the computation going through that state, and
>> >> this in the arithmetical sense, which implied a subtle mathematical
>> >> redundancy.
>>
>> > Not at all.
>>
>> It follows from saying "yes" to a material re-incarnation. I have no
>> clue why you say so.
>
> No consequences about an immaterial re-incarnation
> follow from saying yes to a mteriali re-incarnation
>
>> > I would only say yes to a material re-incarnation.
>>
>> yes that is comp.
>
> That is CTM
>
>> > I
>> > don't believe in infinities of really existing immateial numbers.
>>
>> You don't have to.
>
>
> No I don't.. I don't have to to beleive in CTM.
> And without Platonism, I cannot exist in an immaterial
> machine because there aren't any.
>
>>*That* is the MGA point. Unless you make
>> consciousness and matter into actual infinite, but then you can no
>> more say yes to a *digital* surgeon.
>
> Without Platonism, I cannot exist in an immaterial
> machine because there aren't any. Formalism
> refutes your conclusion without bringing in infinities.
>
>> >> Then the MGA enforces that all universal machine first person future
>> >> experience is statistically dependent of a sum on all those
>> >> computations.
>>
>> > They don't exist/
>>
>> They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is all
>> what is used.
>
> You mean they exist Platonically. For formlalists,
> such "existence" is a mere metaphor and has
> no metaphyscial consequences.
>
>> >> If formalism is true, there is no matter, either.
>>
>> > No,that does not follow.
>>
>> You believe in formalism for math, but not for physics. OK. Fair enough.
>> I was using "formalism" in metaphysics or theology.
>
>
>
>
>> > The existence of anyhting immaterial is a metaphysical notion
>>
>> I don't see why.
>
> For the same reason that the existence of anyhting material is a
> metaphysical notion
>
>>I believe that the truth of a proposition like "It
>> exist prime numbers" is a matter of mathematics, not of metaphysics.
>
> So do I. I also believe that the *meaining* of exists
> is a philosophical question (as in the papers I qutoed)
> and that your arguemnt does not go throuigh without
> takign a stance on that philosophical quesiton.
>
>> You seem to believe we have to do those reification, but the MGA point
>> is that we don't need to do that, at least once we accept the idea
>> that "I" am not "my material" body, as we do when saying yes to a
>> doctor, even for a "material" re-incarnation, given that anything
>> material is substituted by different "tokens".
>
> There is no valid implication from "I am not
> dependent on any particular matter" to
> "I am independent of all matter".
>
>>You still dodge the
>> critics of any part of the argument, by using philosophically remark
>> which you don't show the relevance *at the place of the reasoning*.
>> Science does not work like that.
>
> You are not doing science, you are doing philosohpy.
>
>
>> > How can I avoid "real" in a discussion of "real"?
>>
>> By adding "in the math sense" or "in the physical sense', etc.
>> But you define "real" by primitively material.
>
> That is false. I assert that I am real in some non-metaphorical
> sense. I can then conclude that I am not being generated
> by a non-existent UD. That reasoning does notr require
> the assumption that real=material. Even if I am an disemobodied
> spirirt, I am still nto being generated by a non-existent UD
>
>>OK, but then you are
>> obliged to admit that a movie of a computation does a computation,
>> which is non sense.
>
>
>
>> >> I have personally less doubt about my consciousness, and about my
>> >> believe in the prime numbers than in anything material. Physicists
>> >> avoid the question, except when interested in the conceptual problems
>> >> posed by QM.
>>
>> > You can't validly infer the actual non-existence of matter
>> > from beliefs about numbers.
>>
>> I have never done that. I show that we cannot epistemologically use a
>> notion of matter to explain the first person account of observation.
>
> Your argument does not fgo
> through on pure espistemologiy, you
> have to be makign metaphysical assumptions
> since your conclusions are metaphyical.
>
>> > At some stage you have
>> > to argue that the "exists" in mathematical statemetns
>> > is metaphysically loaded
>>
>> At which stage, and why?
>
> you
> have to be makign metaphysical assumptions
> since your conclusions are metaphyical.
>
>
>> > and should be interpreted
>> > literally to mean actual existence.
>>
>> I don't see why. Arithmetical existence is quite enough.
>
> If it is no real existence at all, as formalism
> claims, it is not enough.
>
>>You need to
>> reify matter, but MGA shows that such a move contradict the idea that
>> I can survive through a digital substitution. You will save our time
>> by reading the argument.
>
> The conclusion of the MGA can esaily be avoided by
> requiring that a compuation is a causally coherent sequence of
> phsycial states.
>
>> > And that is precisely
>> > because I cannot deny my own actual existence.
>>
>> Yes, but you can deny your material existence, given that nobody has
>> proved that primitive matter exists. This is already in the old dream
>> argument used in both the west and the east by the (objective, non
>> solipsist) idealist. You are begging the question.
>
>
>
> THat is irrelevant. Since I exist, I cannot be generatd
> by a non-existent UD. Therefore the "mathematical"
> existence of the UD has to be taken to be actual existence.
>
>> > They are not incompatible with CTM. They are incompatible
>> > with comp because comp=CTM+Platonism. I can keep CTM and
>> > materialism by rejecting Platonism
>>
>> AR = classical logic can be appied in arithmetic (Arithmetical realism)
>> Platonism = "matter emerge from math"
>
> No that is not what Platonism means
>
>> Comp = CTM, and this include Church thesis, and thus arrithmetical
>> realism.
>
> Only bivalence. You are trying to smuggle in Platonic metaphysics.
>
>> Theorem: comp => platonism. or CTM => platonism.
>>
>> You are confusing the hypothesis and the conclusion.
>
> Platonism has to be assumed, otr you cannot
> casually introduce an existing UD in step 07 as you
> do.
>
>> > Everybody makes common-sense metaphysical commitments,
>> > and that includes much of science. It only becomes problematical
>> > in abstruse areas of physics. In any case, your argument is not-
>> > metaphysically
>> > non-comital, you are committed to the Platonic existence of numbers.
>>
>> Given that I am using "Platonic" in the sense of the theologian, and
>> not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to
>> cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind
>> of the reader.
>> I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's
>> all.
>
> That is not enough to derive your
> metaphsycial conclusions.
>
>
>> > The difference between my position and yours is that my commitments
>> > are closer to common sense.
>>
>> That may be true, but I am not even sure about that. All we can say is
>> that since the closure of Plato Academy, it is a Aristotelian
>> theological tradition in Churches and in some "materialist" academies
>> to mock Plato-like theologies, you may be right. But it is not common
>> sense, it is Aristotelian habit. Cats believed in Mouse, but not that
>> mouse are *primitively* material.
>> I believe in matter, you know. But not necessarily in primitive
>> matter. I give you an argument, but you don't read it, so ...
>
>
>
>>
>> > There is not UDA if there is no realy existng UD. There is no
>> > really existing UD if Platonism is false.
>>
>> If you read UDA, you will see that it is using "physical existence" up
>> to the seventh step, and then the 8th step decharge that assumption.
>> Clearly your problem is with the MGA.
>
>
>
>> >> If you are formalist, there
>> >> is a complete formalist reading on what I do, indeed that's AUDA. A
>> >> strict formalist can read UDA as a motivation for AUDA. But I have to
>> >> insist that formalists are in general arithmetical realist ...
>>
>> > Only AR qua bivalence. The whole point of formalism
>> > is the rejection of AR qua existence.
>>
>> This does not make sense. AUDA works very well with a formal notion of
>> mathematical existence.
>
> How can I be generated by a UD that exists only
> as a concpet in mathematicians mind? You are confusing
> the dropping of bivalence with the dorppign of Platonism
>
>> > However truth
>> > alone does nto get you an existing UD, and therefore
>> > does not get my existence inside it.
>>
>> You existence in the UD* (execution of the UD in arithmetic) *in the
>> third person* sense is pretty obvious, once you say yes for the
>> "material execution".
>
> No, it doesn't follow at all without
> Platonism
>
>>Your existence of you in the first person sense
>> is a non trivial consequence of the MGA.
>
>
>
>> >> The consistency of all this eventually resides in subtle aspects of
>> >> the incompleteness phenomena in theoretical computer science. "Comp"
>> >> is also for "computer science". Once you accept the excluded middle
>> >> principle, like most mathematicians, you discover there is a
>> >> "universe" full of living things there, developing complex views.
>>
>> > Nonsense. The LEM is just a formal rule. There is no inference
>> > from bivalence to Platonism
>>
>> Of course. This is provided by the MGA. Here you are using Platonism
>> in my sense (Plato's sense). Good.
>>
>>
>>
>> >> And all this leads to a very elegant theory of everything. The
>> >> ontology is defined by "p is true" if "p" is provable in Robinson
>> >> Arithmetic.
>>
>> > That is not ontology. You keep thinkign you can get
>> > ontology for free jsut by proving somehting on a
>> > blackboard.
>>
>> It just means that something exists if "Ex P(... x ...) is provable in
>> Robinson Arithmetic.
>> I cannot get a metaphysical existence of primitive matter from that.
>> But this is not a problem.
>
> YOu cannot get any metaphysics out of it, including
> Platonism
>
>> Also, when I say that RA provides the ontology, this is in the frame
>> where I trust the doctor, so I don't dispute the "metaphysical (if you
>> want)" existence of the first person conscious experience. saying
>> "yes" to a doctor is not part of a proof on a backboard, it is a
>> theological believe in form of material (at first, in step zero) re-
>> incarnation.
>>
>> I am astonished how much you can discuss an argument without reading it.
>
>
> I am astonished you think a UD can introduced without justification
> >
>
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Received on Tue Sep 15 2009 - 19:21:15 PDT