On 9 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> > However, I do invoke computation (as opposed to just stucture) to
> >explain why we should not expect just a random state. Even if all
> >computations occur, most strings would just be random (e.g. junk code
> >after a program ends), but those involved in computations would not.
>
> False, you have a majority of programs with junk strings as *input*,
> and those inputs are involved in the computations.
> This show that 'our program' should be stable for the randomness
> of the data descrbing implementations of ourselves below our
> substitution level.
First, what I say above is that a string is a string, and if only
a string is needed for consciousness, most would be random. That is
obvious.
Second, I never make a distinction between "input" and "program",
nor does it make much sense to. One could regard Windows 98 as a program,
or as input to the more basic program of the CPU; it's an artificial
distinction.
> > Bullshit. You are clearly relying on infinitely long programs as
> >that is the only way you could get such numbers with your "equivalence"
> >assumption. So you will have lots of white rabbits.
> > By contrast, in my view, the shorter programs dominate because
> >they have a number of copies that goes as 1/2^l, which is due to the fact
> >that shorter programs leave more room for junk code. This eliminates WRs.
>
> You eliminate past/objective WRs. You still don't eliminate
> futur/subjective WRs. You eliminate 3-WR, not 1-WR.
>
> Of course you are denying the distinction between first and
> third person. So I guess you are vaccinated to the conclusion of UDA.
I deny that such a distinction exists for me to be able to deny :-)
> I am not relying on infinitely long programs. But I am relying a priori
> on the state of finite programs in front of arbitrary complex inputs.
There's no difference between those two things.
> I have not the choice: this comes from the fact that the evolution of the
> first person mental state linked to a computational state depends on
> the infinite set of possible reconstitutions in UD*.
>
> If we are both correct (which is possible although I doubt it) then
> the solution of your implementation problem will lead you to a
> very low level implementation: like having the universe as (generalised)
> brain.
>
> >> But how many steps make a computational history?
> >
> > One.
>
> So a single computational state constitutes a comp. history !?!
> (Or perhaps you mean one step = two computational states).
Yes, one step involves a transition between two states.
> In any case you are in trouble, at least with COMP + CUD (there
> exists a concrete UD running integraly in ``our cosmos").
> Because that concrete UD will build all implementations
> of your actual states + any inputs. That is at least k^q, with
> k= the number of inputs any sensory cells can distinguish, and q =
> the number of censory cells (and censory cells defines the border
> of your concrete implementation relatively to a neighborhood.
> And without abandoning comp I don't see how 'new constraints' on
> implementations will help, because the concrete UD will run all of
> these.
I don't quite follow you, but I don't really want to. I think you
have just not absorbed the lesson that measure is proportional to the
number of copies, *not* the number of '1st person' distinctions.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Thu Feb 17 2000 - 10:44:36 PST