Re: AUH/MWI/UDA (Was: Everything is Just a Memory)

From: Alastair Malcolm <amalcolm.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2000 17:40:30 -0000

----- Original Message -----
From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>
> Read [] as necessary.
>
> COMP -> [](such a theory [potential Everett rival] comes from COMP)
>

Does COMP require (I) the objective world (3-world in your terms?) to be
quantisable/digitisable, or (II) only to the extent that it is
phenomenologically indistinguishable from a continuous world (in the
1-world?)?

If (II), then we could have a theory describing the world, which, when
explicated, specifies a world which includes continua. Then your statement
above, without additional assumptions, would be false (that is, we could
have a theory whose corresponding world is subjectively indistinguishable
from that corresponding to a COMP-derived theory (which might have to be
complex and ad-hoc in order to support this indistinguishability), but which
in its explicated form is not itself precisely derivable from COMP).

If (I), I can't see how the requirement (for a digitisable objective world)
follows from your definition of COMP.

> (COMP + MWI) -> [](COMP -> MWI),

For the LHS, do you mean (a) MWI is true in the sense of being *consistent*
in our world (but not necessarily actually *applying* to our world) or (b)
MWI is actualy applicable to our world?

If (a), I agree, but can't see what point you are trying to make. If (b),
then to my mind the RHS does not follow without additional assumptions,
since the applicability of MWI to this world does not logically entail its
applicability to others, COMP or no COMP. (I assume the normal
interpretation of [] as 'for all logically possible worlds ...')

Alastair


>
> (COMP + SEUC) -> [](COMP -> SEUC)) ; SEUC = Schroedinger Equation is
> (essentially) Universally
> Correct
>
> I agree that COMP is not a theory, but is a principle, based, among
> other things, on a non axiomatisable plenitude (arithmetical truth
> actually).
>
> COMP => 1-SEUC, 3-SEUC ? I don't know.
>
> Bruno
>
>
Received on Tue Feb 15 2000 - 09:52:26 PST

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