2009/9/2 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>> change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>> successive capsules through time, and then we're either appealing to
>> data that's no longer accessible at the time it's supposed to be
>> efficacious, or we've flipped into a block view. So it seems like
>> there's something missing in our conception of how experiential time
>> could translate from the physical to the psychological and vice versa,
>> because it seems we can't help appealing to both quasi-flux and
>> quasi-block models to save the appearances.
>>
>
> Bertrand Russell wrote a paper in which he took short durations,
> "moments", as basic and showed that the time of physics could be derived
> from the overlap of moments.
That's interesting, but what does "the overlap of moments" mean?
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>>
>>
>>> There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
>>> not analyzable in terms of physics.
>>>
>>
>> Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
>> present is very odd in the face of either the flux or block view of
>> time in physics. Introspection convinces us (me anyway) that there is
>> some psychologically significant duration beyond the momentary that is
>> indispensable to sensory experience (think of how we grasp melodies as
>> opposed to pitch). On a physical analysis of the brain, we clearly
>> cannot argue under the flux approach for any influence that isn't
>> actually present within any given moment as having any relevance to
>> experiential content, so we're forced to assume some sort of
>> physically-structured 'temporal' encapsulation of multiple snapshots,
>> of more than momentary total duration, that relies on the
>> incorporation of memory of what's just past.
>>
>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>> change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>> successive capsules through time, and then we're either appealing to
>> data that's no longer accessible at the time it's supposed to be
>> efficacious, or we've flipped into a block view. So it seems like
>> there's something missing in our conception of how experiential time
>> could translate from the physical to the psychological and vice versa,
>> because it seems we can't help appealing to both quasi-flux and
>> quasi-block models to save the appearances.
>>
>
> Bertrand Russell wrote a paper in which he took short durations,
> "moments", as basic and showed that the time of physics could be derived
> from the overlap of moments.
>
> Brent
>
> >
>
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Wed Sep 02 2009 - 01:46:55 PDT