On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
> > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> > on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to
> > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
> > be founded on CTM
>
> coupled with Platonism.
With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point. What Bruno has
demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
virtuality*. Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous.
Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
RITSIAR=platonic. Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous. But this is the
value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
theoretical conjunctions.
David
> On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
>
> > >> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> > >> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
> > >> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
> > >> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
> > >> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>
> > > No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
> > > forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
> > > on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
> > > likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
> > > to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
> > > real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
> > > between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
>
> > Well, the either the Olympia/MGA reductios entail this consequence, or
> > they don't. You imply that they don't, but you still haven't put
> > forward a clear refutation in a fully explicit form that could be
> > considered here on its merits.
>
> No-one's put forward a clear statement of it either.
>
> > Until you can do this, it isn't a
> > question of certain or good-enough knowledge, but rather about the
> > logical entailment of CTM itself.
>
> It's about both. It can have entail possibilities that
> are very unlikely.
>
> > This is an extremely non-trivial
> > point: the burden of the argument is that CTM entails a reversal in
> > world-view; it is fundamentally incompatible with a materialist
> > metaphysics.
>
> > > BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
> > > a smaller material universe?
>
> > That is a tenable view. But not with the simultaneous assumption of
> > CTM.
>
> Because?
>
> >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
> > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> > on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to
> > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
> > be founded on CTM
>
> coupled with Platonism.
>
> > David
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 07:00:02 PDT