2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
>> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
>> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
>> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>
> No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
> forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
> on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
> likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
> to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
> real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
> between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
Well, the either the Olympia/MGA reductios entail this consequence, or
they don't. You imply that they don't, but you still haven't put
forward a clear refutation in a fully explicit form that could be
considered here on its merits. Until you can do this, it isn't a
question of certain or good-enough knowledge, but rather about the
logical entailment of CTM itself. This is an extremely non-trivial
point: the burden of the argument is that CTM entails a reversal in
world-view; it is fundamentally incompatible with a materialist
metaphysics.
> BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
> a smaller material universe?
That is a tenable view. But not with the simultaneous assumption of
CTM. That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to
the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
be founded on CTM
David
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
>>
>> >> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
>> >> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
>> >> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>>
>> > Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
>> > that we are 1 level deep, 02 levels deep... in a virtualisation.
>>
>> > Real reality is the simplest assumption
>>
>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
>> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
>> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
>> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>
> No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
> forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
> on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
> likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
> to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
> real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
> between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
>
> BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
> a smaller material universe?
>
> >
>
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 12:26:02 PDT