On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
>
> > I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
> > ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical propositions are
> > either true or false.
>
> Yes, I think I finally understand your view on this. It relies on the
> denial of CTM+PM as a theory of mind,
I thought it was supposed to be a disproof
Anyone can deny something
> but does not thereby rule out
> the conceivability of a level of zero-virtuality supervening on PM.
> Rather it shows that, for any putative computational realisation of
> mind, any such attribution is both absolutely unknowable and causally
> irrelevant.
I have argued that it is unknowable in the sense that
sceptical hypotheses sucha s the BIV are undisprovable,
We generally disregard them anyway,
since, for one thing, we would have no idea which to accept.
> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
that we are 1 level deep, 02 levels deep... in a virtualisation.
Real reality is the simplest assumption
> IOW it is the
> prior assumption of CTM itself that drives the chain of inference, as
> you have always claimed. And I further agree that *on the basis of
> CTM* it then follows that no meaning of 'exist' should be taken
> literally. It is very much to your credit that you have laid bare
> these hidden implications of CTM, as I think they are central to most
> of the myriad confusions that surround it. If people have a complaint
> about the implications, they cannot now dodge the fact that this
> disquiet is unavoidably entailed by CTM itself.
>
> David
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 01:32:25 PDT