Re: Dreaming On

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2009 20:59:12 +0200

On 29 Aug 2009, at 18:06, John Mikes wrote:

> Bruno,
> what do you call "physics"?
> our figment based upon the old Greek's smart sophistication as THEY
> saw the material world,

The greeks have discussed many different theories of matter, from
Atomism to more idealistic neoplaonist theories, where matter is
somehow the border of our ignorance (which became necessary to tale
into account if you work in the computationalist theory of mind).

I don't know the truth, but I derive consequences from set of beliefs.

> or
> the science BEFORE Niels Bohr, or
> after QM, the newer (recent?) theories galore,

I show that if you assume Church thesis and the idea that the brain is
Post Markov Church Turing emulable (and there are no evidence it
doesn't) then the apparent many worlds of QM confirms indeed a
prediction about infinities of state superposition. And the math
already shows a piece of the linear symmetrical quantum internal
winner (in the white rabbits hunt)

> or
> the 'scientific' stance that will develop during the next millennia?
> (Which still may not be the final 'omniscience').

To understand what a universal machine is, really means you understand
that you will never understand that.
It makes you more ignorant, and it prevents theology and science from

> BM: *"Physics is never in Platonia. Physics is
> "Platonia" (Arithmetic) as
> seen from inside. Physics is what is *observed* by self-referentially
> correct universal machines/numbers."*
> Which calls for the fundamental question:
> Do those 'universal machines/numbers' include what they don't include?

I am not sure what to say. The term "include" here is ambiguous, and
has to have two different meaning for each occurrence in your sentence
to make sense.

You are (at least) a universal machine (no need of comp here, just
CT), John, so tell me.

> (I ask about more than 'Turing-emulable, which is a concept within
> our today's idea of a primitive contraption of a 'Turing-computer'.

If this was true, you should try to refute Church Thesis.

> I believe you identify in some way "machine" (as: universal!) even
> if you did not identify 'numbers',

I don't understand. Please wait for my explanation of Church thesis,
but I have to go through Cantor before. If only to understand there
are far more functions from N to N, than there are computable
functions. "Computability theory" is realy the study of the degrees of
uncomputability. Interesting things happens on the boarder between
computability and uncomputability.

> but I believe you have some idea about them, please, consider my
> question as reaching BEYOND such idea).
> We speak about absolutes - as the contained ideas in our limited
> minds.

The interesting thing is that with Church thesis we get a clear
separation between

computability (which appears to be absolute, machine independent,
and yet has a notion of universality)


provability (which appears to be relative, machine or formal system
dependent, and has no notion of universality (but still obeys some
general non trivial laws).

> How can we define (imagine?) something beyond our mind's capabilities?

This is exactly what Church thesis makes possible. John, I don't know
if "yes doctor"+CT is true. But if it is true or not, I can explain to
you how universal machine can discover and sometimes grasp things
beyond their *current* abilities.

> OR: do we restrict Nature's Totality (Everything?) to whatever we
> can think of?

What we can do with numbers and addition and multiplication is already
far beyond what any universal machine can imagine.

Hmm... Gödel has killed the reductionist conception we did have about

> I did not understand your last par. (Not even the question upon
> which it was written).

My last par is part of the seventh step of UDA.
Don't worry, I am explaining this again, but very slowly ( I am a bit
busy, sorry).
At some point it has to be technical, that is why I do some math.

That explanation is really an explanation of Church Thesis, or of the
discovery of the universal machine, and why and in which sense it is
universal. Without universal machine, there is no universal
dovetailing, and no UDA. Without elementary arithmetic being
universal, there would be no internal views in arithmetic. Those
internal views are far beyond arithmetic, and we, the universal
machine, have those, partially communicable views.


> On Fri, Aug 28, 2009 at 1:02 PM, Bruno Marchal <>
> wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
> >>>> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are
> >>>> religious in
> >>>> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body
> >>>> problem. I
> >>>> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
> >>>> uncomputable in the universe. But we have not find anything
> >>>> uncomputable in the universe, except the quantum indeterminacy,
> but
> >>>> this is the kind of uncomputability predicted by the comp theory
> >>>> (and
> >>>> AUDA suggested it is exactly the uncomputable aspect of the
> >>>> universe
> >>>> predicted by comp).
> >>>>
> >>>> So you are postulating an unknown property of matter just to make
> >>>> the
> >>>> comp theory false. This is really a matter-of-the gaps (cf "god-
> of-
> >>>> the
> >>>> gaps") use of matter.
> >>> No uncomputable property is needed. If it is a fact that consc.
> >>> supervenes
> >>> directly on matter, then no immaterial machine or virtualisation
> can
> >>> be conscious.
> >>
> >> OK.
> >> But to be honest I have no clue what "matter" can be in that
> setting,
> >> nor what "directly" could possibly mean in "consciousness
> supervenes
> >> *directly* on matter".
> >> I think that you are saying or meaning that for a computation to
> have
> >> consciousness, the computation needs to be implemented in a "real
> >> material reality", but that is the point which MGA makes
> >> epistemologically inconsistant.
> >>
> >>
> >>> That does not prove CTM false, but it does disprove the argument
> >>> that
> >>> "if physics is computible, then the CTM is true"
> >>
> >>
> >> We have both "physics is computable" entails "my brain is
> computable"
> >> which entails I can say "yes to the doctor", which entails CTM.
> >> And we have that "physics is computable" entails CTM is false
> >> (because
> >> by UDA, CTM entails that physics cannot be entirely computable,
> >
> > This seems to already assume that physics and computation are the
> same
> > kind of thing, i.e. physics is in Platonia or CTM is a statement
> about
> > real machines.
> I think there is a misunderstanding.
> If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is responsible
> for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume
> some form of naturalism/materialism or computationalism).OK? If not,
> your brain (generalized or not) does not obeys to the laws of physics.
> Then, UDA shows that if we assume we are Turing emulable, then, if we
> observe ourself below the level of substitution, we are confronted
> with the many computations going through our states, and physics is
> given by a measure on the indeterminacy on those computations.
> Physics is never in Platonia. Physics is "Platonia" (Arithmetic) as
> seen from inside. Physics is what is *observed* by self-referentially
> correct universal machines/numbers.
> CTM is always a statement about "real person" with respect to its most
> probable history/histories (from which the computationalist can trust
> or not his/her doctor).
> >> and it
> >> is an open problem if that non computability comes only from what
> is
> >> contingent in the computational histories).
> >
> > Is the contingency of the form some things happen and some things
> > don't?
> The contingency is of the form some things happen, for me or us, and
> some things don't happen, for me or us, but all consistent things
> happens for some one or someone else, yet some phenomenon have a
> measure near 0, and some have a measure near one, and many have
> measure in between, and this with respect to anybody (anysoul,
> anymind).
> Bruno
> >

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Received on Sat Aug 29 2009 - 20:59:12 PDT

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