On Aug 29, 7:34 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> marc.geddes wrote:
>
> > No, I think the buck stops with analogical reasoning, since no form of
> > reasoning is more powerful. Analogical reasoning can produce priors
> > and handle knowledge representation (via categorization),
>
> Really? How does analogy assign probabilities or degrees of belief?
> What degree of belief does it assign to "Global warming is caused by
> burning fossil fuel" for example?
Analogical reasoning is based on similarity measures (degrees of
similarities between two concepts), it remains to be seen how to
convert this to probabilities.
> But obviously reasoning, per se, is at least as powerful as analogical
> reasoning, since it includes analogical as well as axiomatic,
> probabilistic, metaphorical, intuitionist, etc. My point is that you
> have not given any definition of analogical reasoning. By leaving it
> vague and undefined you allow yourself to alternately identify every
> kind of reasoning as analogical - or a special case of analogical.
> Which isn't wrong - but it doesn't have much content either.
>
> Brent
Sure, that's a good point, but that's because analogical reasoning has
not yet been well developed, since everyone has focused on Bayesian
reasoning... the point of this post was to show that there's a
neglected alternative.
There's are tentative definitions of analogical reasoning in the
literature, for instance ‘Analogies as Categorization’ (Atkins)
http://www.compadre.org/PER/document/ServeFile.cfm?DocID=186&ID=4726
It remains to be seen how it gets developed.
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Received on Sat Aug 29 2009 - 00:45:26 PDT