2009/8/29 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>>>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden>:
>>>>>>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
>>>>>>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
>>>>>>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
>>>>>>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
>>>>>>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
>>>>>>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
>>>>>>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
>>>>>> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations
>>>>>> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the
>>>>>> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how
>>>>>> 02 different physical process could generate the same computation
>>>>>> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two
>>>>>> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing
>>>>>> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Quentin
>>>>> Try substituting "lengths" for "computations". Are lengths primary
>>>>> because the same length can occur in different physical objects?
>>>>>
>>>>> Brent
>>>>>
>>>> Why would I ? It's not the same thing at all... You could have said
>>>> substitute by 'red'... there are multiple physical red object.
>>>>
>>>> The thing is you can come up with an infinity of physical (possible)
>>>> realisation for a given computation. So the question is what is
>>>> linking the computation to the physical realisation if not the
>>>> abstract rules (which don't exists with physicalism, because there
>>>> exists only "realized" computations... no abstract thing) ?
>>> Lengths are abstract to, but we don't take them to be fundamental.
>>> Your reasoning is Platonism; you end up reifying every abstraction
>>> simply because they are common to multiple realizations.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>
>> I still disagree (about your wording game)... computation is not a
>> property of a thing like a length is, it's a process.
>
> So is walking. Shall we reify walking too? And then take it to be
> fundamental?
>
... Is it a joke or what I'm writing is non-sense ?
>>
>> And yes I assume abstract rules simply exists...
>
> I have no problem with taking rules to exist, but that's not the same
> as assuming they are fundamental and can exist independently.
>
>>that's what allows me
>> to build "concrete" realisation of such computation.
>
> I think they must exist in your brain first.
>
> Brent
Well I think they exist independantly of my brain... My brain plays no
roles at all in their existence. (Nor yours, nor any)
Quentin
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Sat Aug 29 2009 - 00:46:20 PDT