2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>>>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden>:
>>>>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
>>>>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
>>>>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
>>>>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
>>>>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
>>>>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
>>>>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
>>>> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations
>>>> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the
>>>> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how
>>>> 02 different physical process could generate the same computation
>>>> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two
>>>> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing
>>>> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ?
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Quentin
>>> Try substituting "lengths" for "computations". Are lengths primary
>>> because the same length can occur in different physical objects?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Why would I ? It's not the same thing at all... You could have said
>> substitute by 'red'... there are multiple physical red object.
>>
>> The thing is you can come up with an infinity of physical (possible)
>> realisation for a given computation. So the question is what is
>> linking the computation to the physical realisation if not the
>> abstract rules (which don't exists with physicalism, because there
>> exists only "realized" computations... no abstract thing) ?
>
> Lengths are abstract to, but we don't take them to be fundamental.
> Your reasoning is Platonism; you end up reifying every abstraction
> simply because they are common to multiple realizations.
>
> Brent
I still disagree (about your wording game)... computation is not a
property of a thing like a length is, it's a process.
And yes I assume abstract rules simply exists... that's what allows me
to build "concrete" realisation of such computation.
Regards,
Quentin
>
>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Fri Aug 28 2009 - 23:47:19 PDT