On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>>> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are
>>>> religious in
>>>> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body
>>>> problem. I
>>>> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
>>>> uncomputable in the universe. But we have not find anything
>>>> uncomputable in the universe, except the quantum indeterminacy, but
>>>> this is the kind of uncomputability predicted by the comp theory
>>>> (and
>>>> AUDA suggested it is exactly the uncomputable aspect of the
>>>> universe
>>>> predicted by comp).
>>>>
>>>> So you are postulating an unknown property of matter just to make
>>>> the
>>>> comp theory false. This is really a matter-of-the gaps (cf "god-of-
>>>> the
>>>> gaps") use of matter.
>>> No uncomputable property is needed. If it is a fact that consc.
>>> supervenes
>>> directly on matter, then no immaterial machine or virtualisation can
>>> be conscious.
>>
>> OK.
>> But to be honest I have no clue what "matter" can be in that setting,
>> nor what "directly" could possibly mean in "consciousness supervenes
>> *directly* on matter".
>> I think that you are saying or meaning that for a computation to have
>> consciousness, the computation needs to be implemented in a "real
>> material reality", but that is the point which MGA makes
>> epistemologically inconsistant.
>>
>>
>>> That does not prove CTM false, but it does disprove the argument
>>> that
>>> "if physics is computible, then the CTM is true"
>>
>>
>> We have both "physics is computable" entails "my brain is computable"
>> which entails I can say "yes to the doctor", which entails CTM.
>> And we have that "physics is computable" entails CTM is false
>> (because
>> by UDA, CTM entails that physics cannot be entirely computable,
>
> This seems to already assume that physics and computation are the same
> kind of thing, i.e. physics is in Platonia or CTM is a statement about
> real machines.
I think there is a misunderstanding.
If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is responsible
for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume
some form of naturalism/materialism or computationalism).OK? If not,
your brain (generalized or not) does not obeys to the laws of physics.
Then, UDA shows that if we assume we are Turing emulable, then, if we
observe ourself below the level of substitution, we are confronted
with the many computations going through our states, and physics is
given by a measure on the indeterminacy on those computations.
Physics is never in Platonia. Physics is "Platonia" (Arithmetic) as
seen from inside. Physics is what is *observed* by self-referentially
correct universal machines/numbers.
CTM is always a statement about "real person" with respect to its most
probable history/histories (from which the computationalist can trust
or not his/her doctor).
>> and it
>> is an open problem if that non computability comes only from what is
>> contingent in the computational histories).
>
> Is the contingency of the form some things happen and some things
> don't?
The contingency is of the form some things happen, for me or us, and
some things don't happen, for me or us, but all consistent things
happens for some one or someone else, yet some phenomenon have a
measure near 0, and some have a measure near one, and many have
measure in between, and this with respect to anybody (anysoul, anymind).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Fri Aug 28 2009 - 19:02:08 PDT