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From: Alastair Malcolm <amalcolm.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 20:15:38 -0000

----- Original Message -----

From: Fred Chen <flipsu5.domain.name.hidden>

*> Can it be argued that the "simplicity" (of QM interpretation,
*

computational

*> implementation) of MWI gives it a larger measure among other
*

possibilities? Or

*> is it the large number of worlds generated by MWI splittings that would do
*

this?

Russell's paper implies simplicity alone is sufficient, but in case it is

not totally watertight (I am not competent to fully assess this), here is a

(pretty Heath-Robinson) argument showing how splittings might conceivably

contribute:

Suppose the minimum functional bit string length for a specification of

Everett many worlds is n. Then we are comparing the measure of SAS's of all

combinations/interpretations of bits up to n. (Bits above n could 'multiply

up' whatever has been specified below n either via different possible

interpretations, different 'don't care' bit combinations, or direct

'multiplier' bit-string segments, dependent (at least partly) on the

particular version of the AUH chosen. Effectively these factors above n

'cancel through' for all different combinations/interpretations of the first

n bits, and so can be ignored.)

Now, in order to 'out-measure' Everett, a theory would have to produce the

complexity needed for SAS's well *within* the n bits, so that the surplus

bits can be used to outnumber the worlds/SAS's produced in the splittings of

Everett's theory, or else it must itself produce Everett-like splittings

(and SAS's) with less than n bits (that is, with greater simplicity than

Everett). There is little indication where such a theory could possibly come

from.

But if there were some theory of similar simplicity to Everett specifying

SAS's in a single world (say something approaching a good old-fashioned

all-Newtonian universe), then it would be the Everett splittings themselves

that would be responsible for the dominant measure (and explain why we see

interference fringes).

Alastair

Received on Tue Feb 08 2000 - 12:26:18 PST

Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2000 20:15:38 -0000

----- Original Message -----

From: Fred Chen <flipsu5.domain.name.hidden>

computational

possibilities? Or

this?

Russell's paper implies simplicity alone is sufficient, but in case it is

not totally watertight (I am not competent to fully assess this), here is a

(pretty Heath-Robinson) argument showing how splittings might conceivably

contribute:

Suppose the minimum functional bit string length for a specification of

Everett many worlds is n. Then we are comparing the measure of SAS's of all

combinations/interpretations of bits up to n. (Bits above n could 'multiply

up' whatever has been specified below n either via different possible

interpretations, different 'don't care' bit combinations, or direct

'multiplier' bit-string segments, dependent (at least partly) on the

particular version of the AUH chosen. Effectively these factors above n

'cancel through' for all different combinations/interpretations of the first

n bits, and so can be ignored.)

Now, in order to 'out-measure' Everett, a theory would have to produce the

complexity needed for SAS's well *within* the n bits, so that the surplus

bits can be used to outnumber the worlds/SAS's produced in the splittings of

Everett's theory, or else it must itself produce Everett-like splittings

(and SAS's) with less than n bits (that is, with greater simplicity than

Everett). There is little indication where such a theory could possibly come

from.

But if there were some theory of similar simplicity to Everett specifying

SAS's in a single world (say something approaching a good old-fashioned

all-Newtonian universe), then it would be the Everett splittings themselves

that would be responsible for the dominant measure (and explain why we see

interference fringes).

Alastair

Received on Tue Feb 08 2000 - 12:26:18 PST

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