>From the bigger perspective, I don't believe QTI as I don't believe in time
or an objective relationship between thoughts. Both are necessary for QTI to
make sense.
But for the purposes of our subjective, everyday world, I believe in QTI. I
simply do not understand why you don't (I really must be thick, or perhaps
it's the emperor's new clothes).
Put yourself in the cat's shoebox. You can expect to be there at tea-time.
You can plan to go and catch mice. The fact that you will not be there in
50% of 'subsequent' universes is quite irrelevant.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jacques M. Mallah [SMTP:jqm1584.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Wednesday, 02 February, 2000 6:40 PM
> To: Higgo James
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: RE: normalization
>
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Higgo James wrote:
> > Ah, so Jacques believes in QTI for cats
>
> Hell no. You obviously didn't read what I wrote
> carefully. Besides, my impression was that you no longer believe QTI.
> As I explicitly made clear with the last computation (and as would
> have been obvious anyway) the fact that the Cat's measure is reduced by
> half, on average, shortens the Cat's life.
> The 100% is only a *conditional* probability, given that the Cat
> survived, that the Cat would survive. Hence it is pretty silly to compute
> it. This goes to show why I said the Schrodinger's Cat example was a bad
> one to use as it is conducive to letting people make such errors.
>
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Jacques M. Mallah [SMTP:jqm1584.domain.name.hidden]
> > > Sent: Tuesday, 01 February, 2000 10:22 PM
> > > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > > Subject: Re: normalization
> > >
> > > On Tue, 18 Jan 2000 GSLevy.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> > > > jqm1584.domain.name.hidden writes:
> > > > > On Tue, 18 Jan 2000 GSLevy.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> > > > > > jqm1584.domain.name.hidden writes:
> > > > > > > The RSSA is not another way of viewing the world; it is a
> > > > > > > category error.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I use the RSSA as the basis for calculating what I call the
> > > relative
> > > > > > probability, in this group the first person probability, or,
> > > equivalently,
> > > > > > the probability conditional on the life of the observer. The
> ASSA
> > > is by
> > > > > > extension, the assumption for calculating the 3rd person
> > > probability.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Let us perform a thought experiment.
> > > > > > Imagine that you are the scientist in the Schroedinger cat
> > > experiment.
> > > > >
> > > > > Scratch that. Right now let's stick to the example with Bruno
> and
> > > > > the 3 cities, because it's better for the current point.
> > > > > Suppose Bruno, in 1999, wants to know if he is more likely to be
> > > > > in Washington or in Moscow during 2001.
> > > > > First of all, that is not a well defined question, because
> > > > > "Bruno" must be defined. Suppose we define it to mean the set of
> all
> > > > > Bruno-like observations, where by "Bruno-like" we can assume we
> know
> > > what
> > > > > qualifies.
> > > > > But then the question becomes meaningless, because it is 100%
> > > > > certain that he will be in *both* cities. A 3rd person would
> have to
> > > > > agree with that, he is in *both* cities.
> > > > > So let's ask a meaningful question. Among the set of Bruno-like
> > > > > observations in 2001, what is the effective probability of such
> an
> > > > > observation being in Moscow?
> > > > > This is just a conditional effective probability so we use the
> > > > > same rule we always use:
> > > > > p(Moscow|Bruno in 2001) =
> > > > > M(Moscow, Bru. 2001) / [M(Moscow, Bru. 2001) + M(Washington, Bru.
> > > 2001)]
> > > > > where M is the measure.
> > > > > So in this case the conditional effective probability of him
> > > > > seeing Moscow at that time is 10%, and in *1999* he knows he
> should
> > > brush
> > > > > up on his English because his future 'selves' will be affected by
> > > that.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Fine, you have computed the third person probability.
> > >
> > > Bullshit. There is no such thing. As I said, a 3rd person would
> > > say that he is in both cities for certain. What I computed was the
> > > effective probability for Bruno's.
> > >
> > > > Unfortunately, your
> > > > example does not have the option of having an independent observer,
> and
> > > > therefore does not illustrate the concept I am trying to
> communicate.
> > >
> > > How can an example not have an option? Evidently your concept of
> > > "independent observer" is closely tied to QM physics, and the fact
> that I
> > > am discussing a different situation messes it up.
> > >
> > > > Please follow and answer my thought experiment the way I posed it,
> that
> > > is
> > > > with an observer who is not threatened with death and a subject who
> is.
> > > It is
> > > > the only way to bring out the concept of relative probability or 1st
> and
> > > 3rd
> > > > person probability.
> > >
> > > I have another view, namely, that the example you mentioned
> > > (Schrodinger's Cat) is conducive to letting you make your errors, and
> it
> > > is the "only way" because your views don't work in a more general
> > > situation.
> > > But because you used the magic word, OK, I'll illustrate the same
> > > methods I used above, using the Cat.
> > >
> > > As far as the human experimenter can tell, the experiment has a
> > > 50% chance to kill the Cat.
> > > Suppose the Cat, before the experiment, wants to know if he is
> > > more likely to be alive or dead after the experiment.
> > > First of all, that is not a well defined question, because
> > > "the Cat" must be defined. Suppose we define it to mean the set of
> all
> > > Cat-like observations, where by "Cat-like" we can assume we know what
> > > qualifies.
> > > Now let's ask a more precise question. Among the set of Cat-like
> > > observations after the experiment, what is the effective probability
> of
> > > such an observation being of a live Cat?
> > > This is just a conditional effective probability so we use the
> > > same rule we always use:
> > > p(alive|Cat sees after experiment) = M(alive, Cat after) / M(alive,
> Cat
> > > after)
> > > where M is the measure.
> > > So in this case the conditional effective probability of him
> > > seeing that he is alive, given that he makes the observation after the
> > > experiment, is 100%. This is the quantity that is analagous to the
> 10%
> > > effective probability Bruno had for being in Moscow (in 2001),
> according
> > > to the ASSA. (While the RSSA claimed 90% for Bruno, but would agree
> with
> > > 100% for the Cat.)
> > > OK. Obviously this was a rather trivial example of a conditional
> > > effective probability. Let's ask one more question. Assume that the
> Cat
> > > was 10 years old at the time of the experiment, and would have lived
> to 20
> > > if he had not been subjected to the experiment. Over his lifetime,
> what
> > > is the effective probability for him to be older than 10?
> > > p(10+|Cat) = M(10+|Cat) / [M(10+|Cat) + M(<10|Cat)] = .5 / (.5 + 1) =
> 1/3
> > >
> > > - - - - - - -
> > > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > > Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
> >
> >
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Received on Thu Feb 03 2000 - 02:07:34 PST