On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker <meeke....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux. But I don't know whether to regard it
> as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a reductio against
> the "yes doctor" hypothesis. Saying yes to the doctor seems very straightforward when you
> just think about the doctor replacing physical elements of your brain with functionally
> similar elements made of silicon or straw or whatever. But then I reflect that I, with my
> new head full of straw, must still interact with the world. So I have not been reduced to
> computation unless the part of the world I interact with is also replaced by computational
> elements (I think this problem is swept under the rug with the phrase "at the appropriate
> level of substitution"). So suppose the doctor also emulates all the world that I will
> ever interact with. Now it is not so clear that such an emulation is computable, but
> suppose it is. Now my consciousness is entirely emulation - but it is also entirely in
> another, emulated, world. In that world it is physically instantiated. So it has not
> been shown that the emulation can be uninstantiated mathematics.
Our last two posts crossed in the ether! Yes, I've wondered about the
possible reductio element in yes doctor - like it's sometimes
forgotten that Schrödinger's poor old tabby was originally proposed as
a reductio against the Copenhagenists. But I'm not sure I agree that
"computation need not be physically instantiated" is strong enough -
MGA is more dismissive of PM than that (Bruno sometimes says that
appeals to PM are 'spurious' with respect to CTM). I think that the
strong entailment of MGA is CTM + PM = false, and that yes doctor is a
promissory note against some future theory of substitution (with the
caveat that it won't be complete).
David
>
> Brent
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Received on Tue Aug 18 2009 - 18:32:12 PDT