Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
>>>> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
>>>> some
>>>> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
>>>> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
>>>> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
>>> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-
>>> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
>>> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor
>>> numbers).
>> If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is
>> no UD.
>
> I think you have a magical conception of reality.
> I don't need to reify number to believe in them.
> I just need to play with them.
>
>
>>> I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent
>>> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
>> I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
>> existence. It is not a structure of anything.
>
> Plotinus says that too! Me too.
> With church thesis this is can be made more precise in term of not-
> computable or not-provable, or some relativizations.
>
>
>
>>> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the
>>> existence of primitive matter.
>> Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each
>> other.
>
> In arithmetic, that happens all the time. More below.
>
>
>
>>> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or
>>> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter
>>> does
>>> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and
>>> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter
>>> Jones
>>> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a
>>> contradiction.
>> It's not a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial
>> PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all.
>
> Once you say yes to the doctor, there are immaterial Peter Jones. All
> your doppelganger emulating you, and being emulated at your level of
> substitution and below relatively occuring in the proof of the Sigma_1
> sentences of Robinson Arithmetic. (The arithmetical version of the UD).
>
>
>>> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
>>> "consciousness
>>> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.
>> No. I just have to deny immaterial existence.
>
> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used
> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions,
> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum).
>
>
>
>> You keep confusing the
>> idea
>> that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
>> with the
>> actual existence of those entities and beliefs.
>
> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It
> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way,
> with correct approximation of its neighborhood. It is hard to
> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge
> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there
> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain.
> In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one,
> it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and
> behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses.
>
>
>>> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that
>>> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease
>>> to
>>> give referents to such "Peter Jones".
>> False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR.
>> I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
>> no-one can see it, so it ain't there.
>
> Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take
> the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer
> science.
> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running
> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented
> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too.
>
>
>>> Fregean sense is enough to see
>>> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove
>>> that
>>> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they
>>> are not.
>> So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
>> the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
>> doesn't make us wrong
>> about anything.
>
>
> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us
> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct
> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is
> material. The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical
> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But
> then your reasoning has to be false too.
> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not
> Turing-emulable,
Why can't I just say I'm not Turing emulated? It seems that your argument uses MGA to
conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It
seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct argument
showing they are material. But this is already well known from "brain in a vat" thought
experiments.
>or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or
> not. At this stage.
> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith,
> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet,
> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix.
>
>
>
>
>
>>> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing
>>> emulable.
>> No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
>> *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.
>
> But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be
> correct to. It is the same reasoning.
> Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"
> one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your
> doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you
> better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that
> sense.
Or it is a relation to the rest of the world and you can say yes so long as the doctor
maintains your relations to the rest of the world - i.e. physically instantiates your
emulation.
Brent
>
>
>
>>> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.
>> Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me
>> materially?
>
> He will try.
>
>
>> Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out.
>
> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which
> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation,
> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent-
> contingent obeys laws.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Tue Aug 18 2009 - 17:31:22 PDT