Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:37:02 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjones.domain.name.hidden
> > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer <laserma....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > Peter Jones wrote:
> > >
> > > > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > > > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described
> by
> > > > > > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
> described or
> > > > > > > explain.
> > >
> > > > > But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced
> from all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical
> models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate predictions
> about observed experimental results, then it becomes something utterly
> mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical experiences whatsoever
> (since all of our intuitions regarding 'matter' are based solely on our
> empirical experiences with how it *behaves* in the sensory realm, and
> the abstract mathematical models give perfectly accurate predictions
> about this behavior).
> > >
> > > > Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
> > > > physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
> > > > it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white
> rabbit
> > > > problem. We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
> > > > universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
> > > > instantiates
> > > > that particualar amtehamtical structure.
> > >
> > > But then it seems like you're really just talking about
> consciousness and qualia--of all the mathematically possible universes
> containing possible self-aware observers, only in some (or one) are
> these possible observers actually real in the sense of having qualia
> (and there qualia being influenced by other, possibly nonconsious
> elements of the mathematical universe they are a part of).
> >
> > No.. I don't need the hypothesis that WR universes are there but
> > unobserved.
>
> What does "are there" mean? It seems to be a synonym for physical
> existence, but my whole point here is that the notion of physical
> existence doesn't even seem well-defined, if this discussion is going to
> get anywhere you need to actually address this argument head on rather
> than just continue to talk as though terms like "exists" and "are there"
> have a transparent meaning. The only kinds of existence that seem
> meaningful to me are the type of Quinean existence I discussed earlier,
> and existence in the sense of conscious experience which is something we
> all know firsthand. Can you explain what "physical existence" is
> supposed to denote if it is not either of these?
>
> > > There's no need to have a middleman called "primary matter", such
> that only some (or one) mathematical possible universes are actually
> instantianted in primary matter, and only those instantiated in primary
> matter give rise to qualia.
> >
> > There is no absolute need, but there are advantages. For instance, the
> > many-wolder might have to admit
> > the existence of zombie universes -- universes that containt
> > *apparent* intelligent lige that is nonetheless unconscious--
> > in order to account for the non-obseration of WR universes.
> >
> > > If you *are* going to add unobservable middlemen like this,
> >
> > I don't concede that PM is unobservable. What exists is material, what
> > is immaterial does not
> > exist. There is therefore a large set of facts about matter. Moreover,
> > the many-worlders extra
> > universes *have* to be unobservable one way or the other, since they
> > are not observed!
>
>
> Who said anything about many worlds? Again, we are free to believe in a
> type of single-universe scenario, let's call it "scenario A", where only
> a single one of the mathematical universes which "exist" in the Quinean
> sense (and it seems you cannot deny that all mathematical structures do
> 'exist' in this sense, since you agree there are objective mathematical
> truths) also "exist" in the giving-rise-to-conscious-experience sense.
> You want to add a third notion of "physical existence", so your
> single-universe scenario, which we can call "scenario B", says that only
> one of the mathematical universes which exist in the Quinean sense also
> exists in the physical sense (i.e. there is actual 'prime matter' whose
> behavior maps perfectly to that unique mathematical description), and
> presumably you believe that only a universe which exists in the physical
> sense can exist in the giving-rise-to-conscious-experience sense. But
> all observations that conscious observers would make about the world in
> scenario B would also be observed in scenario A (assuming that the same
> mathematical universe that is granted physical existence in scenario B
> is the one that's granted conscious existence in scenario A). In both
> scenarios "physical objects" would be identified based on the qualia
> associated with them (color, visual shape, tactile hardness, etc.), and
> based on the fact that they behaved in certain predictable lawlike ways
> which could be boiled down to mathematical rules. If the experiences of
> observers in scenario A are identical in every way to those of observers
> in scenario B, despite the fact that there is no "physical existence" in
> scenario A, then the extra ingredient of "physical existence" makes no
> observable difference, and thus must be something utterly mysterious, we
> might as well call it "clapsahadrical existence".
>
> >
> > >there's no real logical justification for having only one--you could
> say "only some mathematically possible universes are instantiated in
> primary asfgh, and only some of those give rise to qwertyuiop, and only
> the ones with quertyuiop can give rise to zxcvbn, and only ones with
> zxcvbn can give rise to qualia and consciousness".
> >
> > Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
> > not about
> > explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
> > contingency as the price
> > paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both*
> > explanatory
> > desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which
> > Everythingism wins.
>
> Again, I said nothing about "Everythingism", my comments about "physical
> existence" being a meaningless middleman would apply just as well if we
> believed there was only one universe that "existed" in the sense of
> giving rise to first-person experiences and qualia.
>
>
> >
> > > > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or
> "primary asdfgh".
> > >
> > > > You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
> > > > arbitrary.
> > >
> > > My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word
> "matter" which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us,
> when really you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose
> properties are completely divorced from our experiences, more like
> Kant's "noumena" which were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate
> from all phenomenal properties (including quantitative ones).
> >
> > I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal
> > properties could be accounted for
> > as non-mathematical attributes of PM)
>
> Well, see my point above about the complete indistinguishability of
> scenario A from scenario B from the perspective of conscious observers.
>
>
> >
> > > > > And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation
> between this "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If
> not, then I don't see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a
> universe with primary matter but no qualia (all living beings would be
> zombies), or qualia but no primary matter (and if you admit this
> possibility, then why shouldn't we believe this is exactly the type of
> universe we live in?)
> > >
> > > > The second possibility is ruled out because it predicts White
> Rabbits.
> > >
> > > I don't agree, there's no reason you couldn't postulate a measure
> >
> > Yes there is: you have to justify from first principles and not just
> > postulate it.
>
> Huh? Who made up that rule? If you can postulate that only one
> mathematically possible universe exists in the physical sense without
> justifying it from first principles, I can postulate that only one
> mathematically possible universe exists in the
> giving-rise-to-conscious-experience sense.
>
>
> > The problem is that if all possible maths exists, all possible
> > measures exist...
> > you can't pick out one as being, for some contingent reason "the"
> > measure....
> >
> > >on the set of mathematical possibilities which determined the
> likelihood they would actually be experienced by conscious
> observers--this measure might be such that white-rabbit worlds would be
> very improbable, it might even pick out a unique mathematically possible
> universe where the possible observers are actually conscious, while
> assigning zero measure to all other possibilities.
> >
> > So you are appealing to the unknown relationship between maths and
> > qualia, rather than the unknown properties
> > of matter?
>
> If you want to put it that way, sure. This isn't necessarily what I
> believe personally, I'm just pointing out that *if* you want to believe
> in a single universe that "exists" in some sense distinct from the
> Quinean sense, then it's much simpler to just talk about existence in
> the sense of giving rise to conscious experience rather than first
> talking about something mysterious called "physical existence" and then
> as an afterthought adding the additional claim that physical existence
> is required for conscious experience.
I would say that giving-rise-to-conscious-perception = physical-existence. Roughly
speaking perceiving is being kicked back when you kick. It allows ostensive definition.
But I'm not sure this is the same as giving-rise-to-conscious-experience. Would it be
possible to have a stream of conscious experience with no perception, i.e. like a dream
about mathematics, but with no perceptions of the tokens we use to represent mathematical
concepts, i.e. a dream about the number two without any representation like "2" or "two"
or "{{}{{}}}"? I doubt it.
Brent
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Received on Tue Aug 18 2009 - 10:55:15 PDT