On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer <laserma....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo....domain.name.hidden
> > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
>
> > On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > > From: peterdjo....domain.name.hidden
> > > > To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
>
> > > > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
>
> > > > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > > > whole point
>
> > > What does "real" mean?
>
> > ITSIAR
>
> Don't know what that stands for--I think I've seen that abbreviation before in some other recent posts, but there have been a lot of posts I've missed over the last few weeks so maybe it was defined in one of the ones I didn't read. Anyway, could you explain?
In The Sense I Am Real
> > >Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical existence.
>
> > There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.
>
> Of course Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley's idealism was not a very philosophical one, it was either humorous or anti-intellectual, depending on how seriously he intended it.
It was not very apriori or theoretical. But then it is perverse to
ignore the fact that we do in fact exist. Why struggle
for defintions when the brute fact stare yo in the face?
>Any philosopher could tell you that Johnson would have exactly the same experience of feeling the rock against his boot in a lawlike idealist universe, like the "scenario A" I offered in the post before the one you are responding to here.
The he would exist in an idealist universe. He would still exist.
> > >On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)
>
> > It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
> > b) not physcially accountable then they
> > are c) immaterically existent.
>
> What do you mean by "physically accountable"?
What you mean: that there are truths about them that can be
paraphrased into truths about the physical world
> Are you referring to the notion that mathematical truths cannot be paraphrased as physical truths (assuming that what we call the physical world is itself not just a part of Platonia)? If so, then yes, I'd say according to the Quinean definition of "existence", numbers exist but not as part of the physical world.
Mathematical truths are relationships between concepts, and concepts
are neural acitivity. So the paraphrase
can be made.
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Received on Tue Aug 18 2009 - 04:32:18 PDT