Re: Emulation and Stuff

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2009 12:17:41 +0200

On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:

> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
> round.


Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 02 does not
exist? Prime number does not exist? That mathematical existence is a
meaningless notion?

Mathematics would be a physical illusion?

But physics use mathematics, would that not make physics illusory or
circular?

> It's a perfectly consistent assumption. THere is no
> disproof of materialism that doesn't beg the quesiton by
> assuming immaterialism

Well, I do believe in the natural numbers, and I do believe in their
immateriality (the number seven is not made of quantum field, or
waves, or particle).

So either you tell me that you don't believe in the number seven, or
that you have a theory in which the number seven is explained in
materialist term, without assuming numbers in that theory.


>> This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the
>> consciousness problem.
>
> Such as?

Explaining number with physical notions,
and explaining, even partially, physical notions with the use numbers.

> You arguments here are based on the idea
> that primary matter needs to be given a
> purely mathematical expression. That in turn
> is based on an assumption of Platonism. If
> Platonism is false and materialism true,
> one would *expect* mathematical explanation
> to run out at some point. Your "difficulty" is a
> *prediction* of materialism , and therefore a
> successfor materailism

Not at all. Cf the "even partially" in my sentence just above.


>> and some physicists are already open,
>> independently of comp, to the idea that physical objects are relative
>> mathematical (immaterial) objects. Which of course are "no material".
>> Wheeler, Tegmark, for example.
>
> They have a consisent set of assumptions. So do
> their materialist oponents. You can't get an "is true"
> out of a "might be true"

Well the movie graph conclusion is that materialism is not consistent,
unless it opt for eliminativism of persons and/or non computationalism.


>> I tend to believe in many immaterial things. Some are absolutely real
>> (I think) like the natural numbers.
>
> There's your Platonism again. Believe what you like, but don'
> call it proof.


Given that the theorem is "comp => platonism", and given that I am
open to the idea that comp could be correct, I am of course open to
the idea that Platonism may be correct.

But again, I don't need platonism (non-physicalism) to be an
arithmetical realist, like all classical mathematicians. This is
explicit in the assumption. The non physicalism and general
immaterialism is a consequence of the movie graph argument. What is
wrong with it?

> It changes everything. If the UD is a useful ficiton, I cannot be a
> programme running on it, any more than I can book a flight to Narnia.

Would you say that the 1000^1000th base ten decimal of PI is a fiction?


>> There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist, but it
>> happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that,
>> and
>> for them, in-existence does not make sense.
>
> If they don't exist, they don't exist. You don't have the
> rigourous mathematical argument you think
> you have, you have some baroque Chuang-Tzu metaphysics.

I do like Chuang-tzu, and I can see the relation between comp and
Chuang-tzu, although it is more clear with Lao-Tzu, as you may see in
"Conscience et Mécanisme", where an explicit correspondence is
suggested.

So, what you tell me is that you don't believe in *any* form of
mathematical existence.

So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
Arithmetical realism is needed to give a sense to Church thesis, which
is part of comp.

Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
more sure of your position.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Received on Mon Aug 17 2009 - 12:17:41 PDT

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