Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

From: 1Z <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 03:55:54 -0700 (PDT)

On 13 Aug, 10:30, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> On 13 Aug 2009, at 10:53, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales <c.ha....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> >> I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/
> >> operate formally like COMP.... and that '/formally handling
> >> inconsistency/' is not the same thing as '/delivering inconsistency
> >> by
> >> being an informal/ /system/'. BTW I mean informal in the Godellian
> >> sense...simultaneous inconsistency and incompleteness.
>
> > You can have formal systems that are simultaneously inconsistent
> > and incomplete too.
>
> I guess you mean "you can't have formal systems ...".

No

> Or you were talking about paraconsistent system, or relevant systems.
> Then I agree.

yes

> At least in classical and intuitionist logic, all inconsistent systems
> are complete, in the sense of proving all what is true, and also ...
> all what is false. This is due to the fact that (false->A) is a
> tautology. (A being any proposition)
>
> Of course Colin could answer by saying that he was talking about
> "informal system".

He is talking about both: he is contrasting them.

He is guessing the abilities of informal systems, and wrong
about formal systems.

>But thenas Quentin points out, he put the
> conclusion in the hypothesis.
> And what does he mean by "Godelian sense", which makes sense only for
> formal systems?
>
> What Colin means by "informal", in his context, is a bit of a mystery.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Thu Aug 13 2009 - 03:55:54 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:16 PST